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Praise this world to the angel, not the unsayable one, you can’t impress him with 
glorious emotion; in the universe where he feels more powerfully, you are a novice. 
So show him something simple which, formed over generations, lives as our own, 
near our hand and within our gaze. Tell him of Things. He will stand astonished.
Rilke, Ninth Elegy
A Beginning
October 14, 1906 – the first cry. “After twenty-four hours, the baby was given 
mother’s milk […]. We saw the first smile in the sixth week, and observed a general 
inner waking. The first sounds began during the seventh week […].”1 Martha Arendt, 
who made these careful maternal observations during the autumn of 1906, always 
expected much from her daughter. Yet, she could hardly have foreseen that 100 
years later the centennial of her baby girl would be celebrated with conferences 
and lectures around the world.2 However, it was not the bare naked birth of a baby 
girl in a suburb of Hanover which was celebrated and commemorated. Instead, 
what gathered scholars together around the world was the potentiality of thought 
which her “second birth” initiated in the shared world of words. It was this initiation 
which marked an interruption in occidental thought – a new beginning, which still 
endures as a beginning after the death of Arendt over 30 years ago. 
1  Observations from Martha Arendt’s book Unser Kind. Quoted from Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, 
Hannah Arendt. For Love of the World. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982, 13. 
2  This paper was originally given as a presentation in Hannah Arendt anniversary symposium held 
in Helsinki November 2006.
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But what was this new beginning, if not the beginning that began a new 
thought of the beginning itself. In fact, this article will claim that it was this “poetic-
productive” beginning in the field of thought which made Arendt a “creative genius” 
as a “productive” philosopher, instead of being a mere spectator (i.e. theoretician 
of politics) or acting judge (the cultivated critic) as she herself claimed to be.3 
And it is around this thought of the beginning that this paper tries to create some 
humble spiritual exercises, using the spiritual images of angels and demons as its 
metaphorical guiding stars. This, in spite of the fact, that, their recent popularity 
notwithstanding, neither angelology nor demonologies are anymore respected 
academic disciplines in a strict sense.4 But as Arendt, who thought that “the 
language of thinking is essentially metaphorical,”5 once noted: “The spiritual 
exercises are exercises of imagination [einbildungskraft] and they may be more 
relevant to method in the historical sciences than the academic training realizes.”6 
But there still remains the more profound Arendtian problem of liberty, i.e. 
the problem of the abyss of freedom, the problem of how to begin to talk about 
beginning. Michel Foucault, who in his late thought also became interested in 
spiritual exercises described this anxiety as a desire to be freed from the obligation 
to begin […]. Desire to be on the other side of discourse from the outset, without 
having to consider from the outside what might be strange, frightening, and perhaps 
maleficent about it.7 
The desire to be carried along by the shining light of pure angelic discourse 
circumventing the old demons of our well-worn discourses has of course since 
times immemorial guided that famous desire for knowledge which seeks to re-
collect the immemorial arches, the first and last angelic principles of knowledge. 
But even if the ancient Pythagorean saints or the modern angelic logicians could 
manage to begin from the pure subsisting forms (formae subsistentes) as the 
3  ”My profession, if one can even speak of it at all, is political theory. I neither feel like a philosopher, 
nor do I believe that I have been accepted in the circle of philosophers.” Hannah Arendt, “What 
remains? Language remains.” In Jerome Kohn (ed.), Hannah Arendt: Essays in Understanding 
1930–1954. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1994, 1.
4  Instead, in both popular culture and in poetry angels had been a very popular theme at least since 
the 1990s. The figure of an angel has also reappeared as a concept in philosophical and aesthetic 
thought, where it has been related in very different ways to the problems of representation and 
communication. See for example Massimo Cacciari, The Necessary Angel. New York: State University 
of New York Press, 1994; Michel Serres, La légende des anges. Paris: Flammarion, 1993 
5  Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind. New York: A Harvest Book, 1978, Vol. 1, 110.
6  Hannah Arendt, “A Reply to Eric Voegelin?” In Jerome Kohn (ed.), Hannah Arendt: Essays in 
Understanding 1930–1954. New York: Harcourt Brace 1994. Originally published in The Review of 
Politics, 1953.
7  Michel Foucault, L’ordre du discours. Paris: Gallimard, 1971. Translation “The Order of Discourse” 
in R. Young (ed.), Untying the Text: a Poststructuralist Reader. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1981, 51.
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respected Doctor Angelicus defined angels,8 the more earthly modern reflections 
had sought a beginning in the things themselves, whether this has meant starting 
from the original lived experience (phenomenology) or from the recorded natural 
fact (positivism). Should we then commence from the original lived experience of 
the beginning, from the natural birth, which since Aristotle has been seen as the 
natural source of the generative potentiality. But how should we recall any lived 
experience of it? Or should we first state the recorded historical fact that in the 
beginning there was a naked birth, a first cry in a suburb of Hanover? And could 
that pure cry of the beginning have been heard among the “Angelic Orders?”9
At least according to the young Arendt this might have been possible, since in her 
early interpretation of the Duino Elegies she and her first husband, Günther Stern, 
opined that a child in a certain way shares the angelic orders of open eternity: “Only 
child has a deathless existence.”10 Yet, it is its very angelic nature that excludes 
this cry from the public human orders. For Arendt, the birth itself is singular and 
discursively mute and, as death, it cannot be experienced on behalf of the other 
nor expressed in public words. Furthermore, the cry as an expression of pain is too 
subjective to appear in the shared and objective “public ontology.” In the world of 
public appearances, the first cry of the child has no more reality than angels do.11 
Fama (Exercise I)
To be sure, Arendt was always convinced that not only the first cry, but the 
generative natural potentiality as such, “life qua life,” can thrive only in darkness, 
shielded from the light of the public. Hence, the life of the child – where “the 
simple fact of life and growth outweighs the factor of personality”12 – should be 
sheltered from the public affairs: 
The child shares the life of becoming with all living things; in respect to the life and 
its development, the child is a human being in process of becoming […]. Everything 
that lives, not vegetative life alone, emerges from darkness and, however strong 
8  Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica. In Opera omnia, Vol. IV–XII. Romae: Ex Typographia 
Polyglotta, 1882–1948, I, 63q, 1a, 1.
9  Rainer Maria Rilke, Duinon elegiat – Duineser Elegien. Helsinki: WSOY, 1974, 6–7. “Who, if I 
cried out, would hear me among the angelic orders?” Transl. Rainer Maria Rilke, Duino Elegies. San 
Francisco: North Point Press, 2001.
10  Hannah Arendt and Günther Stern, “Rilke’s Duino Elegies.” In Jerome Kohn (ed.), Hannah 
Arendt: Reflections on Literature and Culture. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007, 21. 
11  ”For us, appearance – something that is being seen and heard by others as well as by ourselves 
– constitutes reality.” Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition. Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1958, 50. “Pain […] is so subjective and removed from the world of things and men that it 
cannot assume an appearance at all.” Arendt, The Human Condition, 51.
12  Hannah Arendt, “Crises of Education.” In Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future. New York: 
Penguin Books, 1977, 188.
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its natural tendency to thrust itself into the light, it nevertheless needs security of 
darkness to grow at all.13 
Thus the very task of education, as the sheltering middle ground between public 
and private, was to secure this darkness, which prepares the growth of the natural 
life for its gradual emergence into the public light. It was this firm conviction that 
gave rise to her most controversial comments in her reflections on Little Rock, 
where the physical darkness and whiteness clashed in the field of education. 
Wanting to maintain the clear cut separation between legal equality and social 
prejudices, Arendt claimed that even the natural right for social discrimination 
should be sheltered from the public light. 
The moment social discrimination is legally abolished, the freedom of society is violated 
[…]. The government can legitimately take no steps against social discrimination 
because government can act only in the name of equality – a principle which does not 
obtain in the social sphere.14 
The sun might “rise on the toilsome (ponêrous) and good (agathos)” as the 
Sermon on the Mount declares (Mat. 5:45), but for Arendt the artificial light of 
equality belongs only to those of the good (agathos), who had left their toilsome 
life behind and risen to the proper political sphere as the ancient political wisdom 
states. To this artificial equality “the dark background of mere givenness […] 
formed by our unchangeable and unique nature, breaks […] as the alien.”15 And 
Arendt, because of her own lived experiences, was afraid that the social prejudices 
against the unique aliens would overrun the very idea of political equality if one let 
the differences between artificial public light and natural private darkness become 
blurred. Yet at the same time she thought that the blushing blurriness of this 
distinction was the very nature of that grey social realm where the discriminating 
societies should have the natural right to rule according to their social prejudices. 
As it is in this grey gloom where the winged messenger of social prejudice, the 
feathered Fama (fame), flies in the opposite direction than education and lets “the 
merciless glare of public realm”16 flood into the private life of the people. 
However, it was precisely this “merciless glare” which the Greek victory hymns 
celebrated as the “ancient fame (phêmê) for glorious deeds.” 17 Phêmê was some 
13  Arendt, “Crises of Education”, 185–6.
14  Hannah Arendt, “Reflections on Little Rock.” In Jerome Kohn (ed.), Hannah Arendt: Responsibility 
and Judgement. New York: Schocken Books, 2003, 209.
15  Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism. San Diego: Harvest Book, 1968, 301. “Equality, 
in contrast to all that is involved in mere existence, is not given to us, but is the result of human 
organization.” Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 301. 
16  Arendt, “Crises of Education”, 186.
17  Pindar, Isthmean. In The Odes of Pindar. London: William Heinemann, 1937, I, 4, 23–4.
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kind of goddess also for Hesiod, but now a bad (kalos) one to be avoided.18 
For Arendt Hesiod, to whom “the possibilities of glory and great deeds count 
for nothing,”19 was, however, an exception among the Greeks: “the only Greek 
who unashamedly praises private life.”20 Whereas it was the Roman poet who, 
acknowledging the sacredness of privacy, described this “swiftest of all evils”21 
flying between heaven and earth as an awful monster (monstrum horrendum).22 
Now, it is true that Arendt followed the ancient victory hymns by always stressing 
that fame was the very principle of action in the pre-polis Homeric world with 
its quest for immortal fame. And she even claimed that “polis was supposed to 
multiply the occasions to win ‛immortal fame,’ that is, to multiply the chances for 
everybody to distinguish himself.”23 But it is often forgotten that Arendt also argued 
that the “aim to make extraordinary an ordinary occurrence of everyday life”24 was 
the reason for the eventual “swift decline”25 of the polis and that she criticized its 
supposed disregard for the private sphere. Furthermore, her favorite Homeric hero 
was never the exceptional Achilles with his unceasing effort to excel in personal 
glory and fame, but instead the “pre-Roman” Hector, “who did not place fame and 
glory above else, but fell in battle, a defender of his family altars.”26 By the same 
token it was their desire to trust to Fama, as “the force that would open all doors, 
the ‛radiant Power of Fame’,”27 instead of fighting for the honor of their threatened 
family tradition, that made Arendt scorn the politically ignorant self-deception of 
the Jewish social parvenus.28 The master of this deception was the Potent Wizard, 
Benjamin Disraeli, whose political magic was to discover “the secret of how to 
preserve luck, that natural miracle of pariahdom.”29 But even if Disraeli succeeded 
18  Hesiod, Works and Days. In Hesiod and Homer, Hesiod, the Homeric Hymns and Homerica. 
London: William Heinemann, 1914, 764.
19  Hannah Arendt, “The Great Tradition II. Ruling and Being Ruled.” Social Research. No 4, Vol. 74, 
Winter 2007, 946.
20  Arendt, “The Great Tradition II”, 946.
21  Vergil, Aeneid. In The Bucolics, Aeneid, and Georgics of Vergil. Boston: Ginn & Co., 1900, IV, 173.
22  Vergil, Aeneid, IV, 180.
23  Arendt, The Human Condition, 197.
24  Arendt, The Human Condition, 197.
25  Arendt, The Human Condition, 197.
26  Hannah Arendt, “Introduction into politics.” In Jerome Kohn (ed.), Hannah Arendt: The Promise 
of Politics. New York: Schocken Books, 2005.
27  Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 52.
28  ”For honour never will be won by the cult of success or fame.” From the “disgrace of being a Jew 
there is but one escape – to fight for the honour of the Jewish people as a whole.” Hannah Arendt, 
“Stefan Zweig: Jews in the World of Yesterday.” In J. Kohn and H Feldman (ed.): Hannah Arendt: The 
Jewish Writings. New York: Schocken Books, 2007, 328.
29  Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 68.
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to make himself “the great man of the ‛exception Jews’,”30 his “singular great good 
fortune finally led to the great catastrophe of his people.”31 
Again it was Cicero, the Roman Orator, who differentiated the solid glory of 
honest public words from the deceitful popular fame (fama popularis) that only 
simulates lasting honor.32 In a like manner, Arendt also stated that the simulation 
of political glory as an effort to attain social fame did not bring to light men in 
their unique distinctness but vice versa sought “the worship of that great leveling 
idol, Success.”33 Whereas in her reflections on Walter Benjamin, this difference 
between proper and improper fame, distinctive glory and leveling success, is 
drawn between posthumous solid fame and merchandise success, which makes 
Arendt believe that the winged Fama is more arbitrary in her selection upon the 
living than the dead: 
Fama, that much-coveted goddess, has many faces, and fame comes in many sorts 
and sizes – from the weak notoriety of the cover story to the splendor of an everlasting 
name. Posthumous fame is one of FAMA’s rarer and least desired articles, although 
it is less arbitrary and often more solid than any other sorts, since it only seldom 
bestowed upon mere merchandise. The one who stood most to profit is dead and 
hence it is not for sale.34 
To be sure, Benjamin attained the posthumous, everlasting name, even if 
he was followed through his life by no guardian angel but by the demonic “little 
hunchback.”35 However, this unlucky gambler, who lacked “the natural miracle of 
pariahdom,” acknowledged that this lack was not only his individual misfortune, but 
that in the given social circumstances even the odds seemed to be on the side of 
the privileged. And this acknowledgement made Benjamin a “conscience pariah” in 
clear opposition to Arendt’s portrait of Disraeli, the lucky parvenu par excellence. 
But how about Arendt herself! Clearly more fortunate than Benjamin, she did 
not just manage to escape from the worst political terrors of her times almost by 
sheer luck, but also reached “the notoriety of the cover” with her analysis of this 
30  Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 68.
31  Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 79.
32  Marcus Tullius Cicero, Tusculanarum Disputationum ad M. Brutum libri quinque. Berlin: 
Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1887, III, 3.4.
33  Arendt, “Stefan Zweig”, 324.
34  Hannah Arendt, “Walter Benjamin.” In Hannah Arendt, Men in Dark Times. San Diego: A Harvest 
Book, 1968, 153.
35  “Wherever one looks in Benjamin’s life, one will find the little hunchback.” Arendt, “Walter 
Benjamin,” 168. About Benjamin’s hunchback, see Walter Benjamin, Berlin Childhood around 
1900. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006. I have discussed Benjamin’s 
misfortunes in Markku Koivusalo, “Pakolaisen kuolema.” In T. Kaitaro & M. Roinila (eds.), Filosofin 
kuolema. Helsinki: Summa, 2004.
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very same political terror. And today the director of the center carrying her name 
can write how “her fame, which at times approached notoriety, increased with her 
subsequent publications and has continued to grow posthumously.”36 
In fact this fame did not just approach notoriety, but reached the summit of infamy 
in the Eichmann controversy, where Arendt’s refusal to see a “diabolical or demonic 
profundity”37 in Eichmann took the wings of Fama, spreading a rumour that she 
wanted to reverse the roles of angels and demons in what had been the greatest 
catastrophe of her people. And indeed this new public radiance did not satisfy 
Arendt, who complained to Jaspers that is was “pure blasphemy”38 manipulating 
public opinion in order to destroy her reputation. Jaspers agreed, answering that 
“you had been attached to a fama, which is for you quite injurious and detestable.”39 
This offensive and swiftly flying Fama carried Arendt into the public limelight but 
only by accusing her of committing the very sin of parvenu, i.e. putting personal 
fame above the family altars in her tactless lack of “ahabath Israel.”40 To be sure 
Arendt had wanted to abandon the very age-old sacred history of altars and to 
treat Eichmann’s crime as the unprecedented crime against humanity, a crime 
committed neither by a demon or an angel, but a man of unprecedented banality. 
For Arendt the “winged words”41 of Eichmann actually lacked the wings of thought 
and were nothing but banal clichés revealing the thoughtlessness of man, who as 
“a leaf in the whirlwind of time”42 ended up committing the greatest of crimes. 
It was the thoughtlessness of Eichmann together with the thoughtlessness of 
the whole infamous controversy that set Arendt to re-investigate what was in the 
end her strongest passion. For as Hans Jonas stated in her funeral: “Thinking was 
36  Jerome Kohn, “The World of Hannah Arendt.” Hannah Arendt Papers at the Library of Congress, 
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/arendthtml/essay3.html
37  Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report of the Banality of Evil. New York: Penguin 
Books, 1977, 288. 
38  A letter from Arendt to Jaspers 20 July 1963. In H. Arendt & K. Jaspers, Briefwechsel 1929–1969. 
München: Piper, 1993. Translation mine. 
39  A letter from Jaspers to Arendt 25 July 1963. In Arendt & Jaspers, Briefwechsel, 548.
40  “Love of the Jewish people.” This was the famous charge made by Gershom Scholem in their 
1963 exchange of letters on the Eichmann controversy, published in Encounter in 1964. In contrast to 
her other critics Scholem granted that Arendt still belonged to the Jewish people, but lacked the love 
and the tact of the heart (herzenstakt). Whereas Arendt responded by drawing a distinction between 
political belonging and loving, admitting that she belonged to the Jewish people, but did not count 
either love or heartiness among the political virtues: “Generally speaking, the role of the ‘heart’ in 
politics seems to me altogether questionable.” Hannah Arendt, “The Eichmann controversy. A Letter 
to Geshom Scholem.” In J. Kohn and H. Feldman (eds.), Hannah Arendt: The Jewish Writings. New 
York: Schocken Books, 2007, 467. 
41  Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 105.
42  Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 33.
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her passion.”43 And whereas her political fame never freed itself of certain infamous 
aspects it was thanks to this thinking passion that she had posthumously received 
a more glorious place among the immortal thinkers of the occidental tradition. 
For it was neither her naked physical birth nor her public infamy, but the very 
effort to think afresh the fragments of this “broken” tradition, both loved and hated 
by her, which endowed her own thought with immortality. This freshness was due 
to her ability to make a new beginning in this tradition by paradoxically saving 
those traditional though-fragments which crystallize the experience of beginning, 
i.e. to make a new beginning in the tradition by re-thinking the tradition of the 
beginning. And at the core of this new thinking was the thinking of birth and natality, 
the rethinking of the first cry of the child as the hidden and unspoken truth of the 
spoken beginning.44 It is from this cry of the beginning that we had to begin.
Genius (Exercise II)
Cry of the beginning, the anxiety of beginning, in the occidental imagination 
there seem to be two spiritual creators who are free from it. The more famous is of 
course the old Judeo-Christian God, who created the world from nothing and “saw 
that it was good” (Gen. 1:10), although having ever since Christian Gnosticism 
been accused of being wrong. The other is the artistic and especially romantic 
genius whose angelic role is to function as the messenger of the creativeness of 
nature itself. As feminists have pointed out, both of these spiritual creatures had 
been pictured mainly as manly powers, and even if the romantic genius might need 
his muse, he had always been seen as the incarnation of the masculine formative 
powers of nature. Recently however, Julia Kristeva has sought for uniquely 
female geniuses, counting Hannah Arendt among them. For Kristeva Arendt’s 
posthumous fame resides in her intimate female uniqueness, which surpassed 
all given socio-historical female conditions and made her an extraordinary female 
genius.45 As unique female genius Arendt would also be an angel, the messenger 
of a new spiritual feminism that could overcome the totalitarian tendencies of the 
old materialist mass feminism. 
43  Hans Jonas, “Hannah Arendt, 1906–1975.” Eulogy Delivered at the Funeral Service at Riverside 
Memorial Chapel. Appendix C in Christian Wiese, The Life and Thought of Hans Jonas. Waltham: 
Brandeis University Press, 2007, 180.
44  Infancy as the relation between voice and speech as well as the historico-trancendental condition 
and limit of human discourse is developed in a fertile way by Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben who, 
however, does not mention Arendt in this context, even otherwise she had have a profound influence 
in his thought. See Giorgio Agamben, Infancy and History: The Destruction of Experience. New York: 
Verso, 1993. See also Agamben’s early letter to Arendt. Letter Giorgio Agamben to Hannah Arendt 
February 21, 1970. Correspondence, General, 1938–1976, n.d. Hannah Arendt Papers, Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
45  Julia Kristeva, Hannah Arendt. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001.
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It is indisputably true that Arendt, a critic of totalitarianism and despiser of mass-
society, always wanted to distance herself from the masses. Yet, she also wanted 
to distance herself from feminism, even more than from Zionism. Indeed, Arendt, 
who never denied being a Jew and a woman, affirming them instead gratefully as 
given indisputable facts, never tried to challenge the political or social conditions of 
this given female status in the same way that she called on Jews to challenge the 
Jewish condition.46 From the perspective of political feminism and in the light of her 
own political thinking, this “exceptional woman” seems to have rather acted as the 
very parvenu among the pariah females.47 Far from being the angel of new (or any 
kind) of feminism, in the light of her own thinking, she might have to be classified 
rather as Benjamin Disraeli of feminism. 
Neither did Arendt ever think of herself as a genius and, as Kafka, “clearly 
did not want to be considered a genius, or incarnation of any objective entity.”48 
Indeed her criticism of the modern cult of genius was as harsh as her criticism of 
the commercial mass-society, which she in fact linked together as the two sides 
of the same coin. “The frustration of the human person inherent in a community 
of producers and even more in a commercial society is perhaps best illustrated by 
the phenomenon of genius.”49 For Arendt the very idea of “creative genius as the 
quintessential expression of human greatness was quite unknown to antiquity or 
Middle Ages.”50 And even if the cult and idolization of genius had “absorbed those 
elements of distinctness and uniqueness which find their immediate expression 
only in action and speech,”51 it was for Arendt only a poor substitute for the lost 
human greatness and in fact “harbors the same degradation of the human person 
as the other tenets relevant in commercial society.”52 
But if the Romantic notion of genius as a “superhuman monster”53 was for 
Arendt only a sign of the “empty greatness”54 of a personality cult, she thought 
46  An exception in this regard is her early 1933 review. See Hannah Arendt, “On the Emancipation 
of Women.” In Jerome Kohn (ed.), Hannah Arendt: Essays in Understanding 1930–1954. New York: 
Harcourt Brace, 1994.
47  As Arendt answered in an interview with Günter Gaus, when the latter asked whether the 
emancipation of woman had been a problem for her: “To problem itself played no role for me 
personally. To put it very simple, I have always done what I liked to do.” Hannah Arendt, “What 
remains? Language remains”, 3. 
48  Hannah Arendt, “Franz Kafka, Appreciated Anew.” In Susannah Gottlieb (ed.), Hannah Arendt: 
Reflections on Literature and Culture. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007, 108.
49  Arendt, The Human Condition, 210.
50  Arendt, The Human Condition, 210
51  Arendt, The Human Condition, 210.
52  Arendt, The Human Condition, 211.
53  Arendt, “Franz Kafka, Appreciated Anew”, 108.
54  Arendt, “Franz Kafka, Appreciated Anew”, 108.
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that the Kantian definition of genius as an impersonal gift had more content, 
even if she also thought that in this gift, genius is not a messenger of nature but 
of humankind.55 Yet Arendt did not believe that she had been given this gift. For 
if we follow the famous Kantian distinction between genius and taste (Genie und 
Geschmack), i.e. between creative production and evaluating judgment, it was 
always the talent of taste and good judgment which Arendt considered as her own 
special daimon. Thus never regarding herself as a genius with the originality and 
productive imagination, she however claimed that her special birthright was the 
ability to make judgments, which as she noted “is not the privilege of genius.”56 
The special gift that she claimed to herself was not productive imagination but a 
sense that she associated with good taste, the common sense of the real as her 
sixth sense.57 This common sense should naturally not be mistaken for the vulgar 
taste, since it needs the “enlarged mentality” of the cultivated critic. And far from 
thinking herself as genius, who as Nietzsche reminds us, can never be impartial 
as creator,58 Arendt considered herself as the impartial spectator (theorist) and 
tasteful critic (judge) of the sensible world of common appearances. But was 
there any truth to this? Let us return to Kant’s famous definition according to 
which genius is
the inborn predisposition of the spirit (Gemütsanlage) (ingenium) through which nature 
gives the rule to art. […] Hence the author of a product that he owes to his genius does 
not know himself how the ideas for it come to him […]. For that is also presumably how 
the word ‘‘genius’’ is derived from genius, in the sense of the peculiar guardian and 
guiding spirit given to a man at birth.59
Whereas for Arendt the ancient guiding spirit, the impersonal personality, (Greek 
daimon and Latin genius) was not an inner but a public spirit, disclosing itself in 
action and speech only when witnessed by others: 
55  For Kant genius is the gift “through which nature gives the rule to art.” This conception may seem 
questionable nowadays, and one could take the opposing view that genius is the disposition through 
which mankind itself “gives rules to art.” Arendt, “Franz Kafka, Appreciated Anew”, 108.
56  Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy. Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1982, 63.
57  “What since Thomas Aquinas we call common sense, the sensus communis, is a kind of sixth 
sense, needed to keep my five senses together.” Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Vol. I, 50. In her 1953 
essay “Ideology and Terror,” she had however charged modern ideological thought with presupposing 
such sixth sense. “Hence ideological thinking becomes emancipated from the reality that we perceive 
with our five senses, and insists on a ‘truer’ reality concealed behind all perceptible things, dominating 
them from this place of concealment and requiring a sixth sense that enables us to become aware of 
it.” Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 471
58  Friedrich Nietzsche, Zur Genealogie der Moral. In Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe 
(KSA) 5. München: DTV, 1999, III, 6, 346–9.
59  Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000, 186–7. Translation modified. Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft. In Werke in zwölf Bänden. 
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977, § 46, 241–3.
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This disclosure of who in contradistinction to “what” somebody is […] can be hidden 
only in the complete silence and perfect passivity, but its disclosure can almost never be 
achieved as a willful purpose, as thought one possessed and could dispose of this “who” 
in the same manner he has and can dispose of his qualities […]. The “who” which appears 
so clearly and unmistakably to others, remains hidden from person himself, like the 
daimon in Greek religion which accompanies each man thought his life, always looking 
over his shoulder from behind and thus visible only to those that he encounters.60 
But was the daimon that was looking over Arendt’s shoulders and thus visible 
to the others although hidden from herself really her supposed sixth sense, which 
in fact so often failed to appeal to the others, let alone to everyone?61 Or was it 
actually her imaginative gift to think politics poetically by producing new thoughts 
and concepts for the humankind? Even if this gift was less a gift of nature than 
the gift of muses, those ancient deities who united the existential rhythm of homo 
temporalis by “telling of things that are and that shall be and that were aforetime 
with consenting voice.”62 And as the muses, who derived their names from the Indo-
European root of thought and mind (men), are always plural, originally forming the 
trichotomy of Voice, Practice, and Memory, also Arendt’s productive mind always 
worked through the plurality of concepts and threefold divisions.63 
In fact in her essay on Benjamin, which actually says more about herself, Arendt 
emphasized that Benjamin “without being poet thought poetically.”64 For Arendt, 
thinking in its difference from knowing, as reason in its difference from intellect, is a 
quest for meaning and not a quest for truth.65 And in the spiritual quest for meaning, 
it is metaphor that contains the poetic element of thought, since it “establishes a 
connection which is sensually perceived in its immediacy.”66 The metaphor links the 
thought to its “sensual substructure,” to the totality of sensually experienced data. 
She even claims that Vernuft can be traced back to Vernehmen, which means to 
perceive and hear, whereas metaphorical connects “the sensible and non-sensory 
60  Arendt, The Human Condition, 181.
61  For Arendt “this sensus communis is what judgement appeals to in everyone, and it is this appeal 
that gives the judgements their special validity. The it-pleases-or-displeases-me, which as a feeling 
seems so utterly private and noncommunicative, is actually rooted in this community sense and is 
therefore open to communication once it has been transformed by reflection, which takes all others 
and their feelings into account.” Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, 72.
62  Hesiod, Theogony. In Hesiod and Homer, Hesiod, the Homeric Hymns and Homerica. London: 
William Heinemann, 1914, 39.
63  In her early dissertation we find the trichotomy of Love and in The Human Condition the triadic 
division of vita active, whereas her last writings were structured by a trichotomy of mind.
64  Arendt, “Walter Benjamin”, 166.
65  Arendt even claims that “the basic fallacy, taking precedence over all specific metaphysical 
fallacies is to interpret meaning on the model of truth.” Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Vol. 1, 15.
66  Arendt, “Walter Benjamin”, 166.
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matters – metapherein – carrying over our sense experiences.”67 Through the 
metaphor the world of appearance inserts itself in the thought “bridging the abyss 
between inward and invisible mental activities and the world of appearances.”68 
As taking place in-between the sensible and non-sensible, this “carrying over” 
metaphor actually seems to share the very abode of the Platonic spirituality, where 
“daimonic is in-between (metaxy) divine and mortal.”69 
Nevertheless, in their controversy over the question of modern totalitarianism 
and human nature,70 Eric Voegelin explicitly charged Arendt for forgetting 
this spiritual dimension of daimonic man (daimonios aner) by letting the 
“phenomenal differences”71 obscure the essential and so failing to locate the 
origins of totalitarianism in “the genesis of the spiritual disease.”72 In Voegelin’s 
pneumatological interpretation, totalitarianism as “the climax of a secular 
evolution” was the sickness of the immanentist creed that refuses to live in 
the openness of the spiritual metaxy and is characteristic of both modern 
totalitarianism and liberalism in their shared quest for immanence.73 When Arendt 
wrote that in totalitarianism “human nature as such is a stake”74 since its aim is 
“the transformation of human nature itself,”75 Voegelin claimed that she herself 
“adopts the immanentist ideology.”76 For human nature “that cannot be changed or 
transformed”77 but only destroyed, was for Voegelin the very daimonic in-between, 
as the tension of the mutual participation (metalêpsis) of human and divine. He 
67  Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Vol. 1, 110.
68  Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Vol. 1, 105.
69  “kai gar pan to daimonion metaxu esti theou te kai thnêtou.” Plato, Symposium, 202d-e. Platonis 
Opera – recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit Ioannes Burnet. Tomus II. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1922.
70  Te controversy took place in 1953 in the pages of Review of Politics. Waldemar Gurian asked 
Voegelin to review Origins of Totalitarianism and sent the review to Arendt, whose response Gurian 
also published with a final one page comment from Voegelin.
71  Eric Voegelin, “The Origins of Totalitarianism.” In Ellis Sandoz (ed.), The Collected Works of Eric 
Voegelin, vol. 11. Columbia: The University of Missouri Press, 2000, 16
72  Voegelin, “The Origins”, 16.
73  “The true dividing line in the contemporary crisis does not run between liberals and totalitarians, 
but between the religious and philosophical transcendentalists on the one side and the liberal and 
totalitarian immanentist sectarians on the other side.” Voegelin, “The Origins”, 22.
74  Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 459
75  Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 458.
76  Voegelin, “The Origins”, 21.
77  Voegelin, “The Origins”, 21. Arendt had written that in totalitarianism “the human nature as such 
is at the stake.” Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 495.
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later even capitalized this In-Between (Metaxy)78 as a substantive technical term 
of his new noetic political science, which was supposed to overcome the spiritual 
disease of modernity by remembering (anamnesis), what Voegelin called as the 
Platonic-Aristotelian spiritual quest for the noetic ordering principles.79 
Whereas Arendt, who claimed to have chosen the very “phenomenal differences” 
as the starting point of her “spiritual exercises” argued that it was the very nature 
of ideology to suppress these differences under of the supposed logic of idea. For 
Arendt the unprecedented demonism of totalitarianism was not even its ideology, 
but the “event of totalitarian domination itself”80 that had shattered the traditional 
categories of political thought. And the main problem with this domination was not 
the ideological forgetting of the vertical metaxy, but the destruction of the horizontal 
in-between space of the common appearances. It was the political destruction of the 
common space and the ideological destruction of common sense which according 
to Arendt called forth a new thinking. Indeed, and in reference to Voegelin, she 
noted that a new political philosophy that could become a “new science of politics” 
was once more on the agenda.81 Yet for Arendt this new science should not be 
based on the philosophical anthropology of noetic man (zoon noetikon) but on a 
political anthropology of plural human affairs. For in order to develop a “true political 
philosophy,” philosophers “have to make the plurality of man, out of which arises 
the whole realm of human affairs – in its grandeur and misery – the object of their 
thaumadzein.”82 And if in this new quest for a philosophy of human affairs, which 
could no longer take the old tradition of political philosophy for granted, there was 
still something to remember (anamnesis) from the ancient experience, it was not 
the contemplative quest for the noetic order, but the political experience of the in-
between, shared logos.83 And for Arendt, it is this in-between of shared logos that 
78  “By letting man become conscious of his humanity as existence in tension toward divine reality, 
the hierophanic events engender the knowledge of man’s existence in the divine-human In-Between, 
in Plato’s Metaxy, as well as the language symbols articulating the knowledge.” Eric Voegelin, “Order 
and History: The Ecumenic Age.” In Michael Franz (ed.), The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, vol. 
17. Columbia: The University of Missouri Press, 2000, 50.
79  See Eric Voegelin, “Anamnesis: On the Theory of History and Politics.” In The Collected Works 
of Eric Voegelin, vol. 6. Columbia: The University of Missouri Press, 2002.
80  Arendt, “A Reply to Eric Voegelin”, 405.
81  “The breakdown of common sense in the present world signals that philosophy and politics, 
their old conflict notwithstanding, have suffered the same fate. And that means that the problem of 
philosophy and politics, or the necessity for a new political philosophy from which could come a new 
science of politics, is once more on the agenda.” Hannah Arendt, “Philosophy and Politics.” Social 
Research, Vol. 71, No 3, Fall 2004, 453.
82  Arendt, “Philosophy and Politics”, 453.
83  It was this experience of shared logos that Voegelin’s noetic science wanted to forget by 
strategically bypassing the Aristotelian definition of political man as a living being capable of logos 
and by claiming that “Aristotle characterized man as the zoon noun echon, as the living being 
that possesses Nous.” Eric Vogelin, “Reason: The Classic Experience.” In Ellis Sandoz (ed.), The 
Collected Works of Eric Voegelin, vol. 12. Published Essays: 1966–1985. Columbia: The University 
of Missouri Press, 1990, 267. 
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grounds even the metaphoric in-between of the sensible and non-sensible – not 
only because the non-sensible can become manifest and appear in the world only 
through shared language, but furthermore since thinking itself needs metaphors 
in order to think, to make sense of its abstract concepts.84 Metaphor itself creates 
analogies and it is through analogies and comparisons that thinking both works 
and is able to manifest itself. 
In his Poetics Aristotle wrote that good use of metaphors means seeing the 
resemblances, which is the “token of genius.”85 And if there was a natural talent 
(euphysis) that Arendt had, its token was not her supposedly good public taste, 
but her genius to use the metaphors of a shared language and tradition in order 
to create unprecedented and new concepts of thought and in this way respond to 
what is unprecedented in human affairs. And certainly her most ingenious effort to 
create new thought was trying to think the human experience of beginning through 
the concept of natality, to think beginning poetically through the metaphor of birth. 
Birth (Exercise III)
But as thinking itself had to borrow its metaphors from a shared language, also the 
new thought had to borrow its materials from the old. Arendt stated that Benjamin’s 
poetic thinking expressed itself in his collection of quotations where “transmissibility 
of the past had been replaced by its citability.”86 And she used the metaphor of 
pearl diver to describe Benjamin’s effort to save crystallized fragments of thought 
from the sea-change of occidental thought. Whereas what she herself cited as 
crystallized expression of the thought of the beginning was the “few words with 
which the Gospel announced their ‘glad tidings’: ‘A child has been born to us’.”87 
In fact this citation was even more creative than just taking the quote out of its 
context, since we do not find this quote in any of the gospels. In the book of Isaiah 
(9:6) we find the sentence: “For unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given.” 
But the Gospel of Luke (2:11), the presumed source of Arendt’s citation, reads: 
“For unto you is born this day in the city (polis/civitate) of David a Savior (sôtêr/
salvator), which is Christ (Christos/Christus) the Lord (kurios/dominus).” So, when 
Arendt claims to quote the glad tidings of the gospel, she had in fact omitted all 
the Hellenistic and Judeo-Christian political epithets (polis, savior, messiah and 
lord). Further on Arendt, who saw the apolitical tendencies of Christianity as a 
84  See chapter 12 “Language and Metaphor” in Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Vol. 1.
85  Literally sign of good nature (euphysis). See Aristotle, Poetica. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966, 
1.22, 1459a5.
86  Arendt, “Walter Benjamin”, 193.
87  Arendt, The Human Condition, 247. Italics mine. 
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result of its lost faith in the world, argues however that the gospel is “the most 
glorious and succinct expression” of the faith in and hope for the world.88 Whereas 
it was the pagan Romans – “perhaps the most political people we have known”89 
– that according to Arendt shared the respect for the enduring political world. And 
of course we also find in the Roman poet, Virgil, the celebration of the new birth of 
a boy, as a promise that will make the circling centuries begin anew (magnus ab 
integro saeclorum nascitur ordo) thus inaugurating a new golden era for men. “O 
baby-boy, begin! (Incipe, parve puer).”90 Yet, it was in this political poem that Arendt 
claimed to have discovered an even more secular affirmation of the beginning than 
in the gospel, i.e. the celebration of pure birth as such:
Virgil’s most famous political poem, the Fourth Eclogue […] misunderstood as a 
prophesy of salvation through a theos sotêr […] but, far from predicting the arrival of a 
divine child […] is an affirmation of the divinity of birth as such […] the poet’s belief that 
the world’s potential salvation lies in the very fact that human species regenerates itself 
constantly and forever.91 
This in spite of the fact that Arendt herself had argued that the pure regeneration 
of the species could never constitute a real political beginning, since the latter 
presupposes the foundational act of political genius, the very hallmark of Romans. 
For Arendt the special “political genius of Rome [was] legislation and foundation”92 
that did not merely regenerate the species, but instead dealt politically with the 
abyss of freedom, i.e. the riddle of foundation: “How to re-start time within an 
inexorable time continuum.”93 The solution of this riddle had to form an enduring 
foundation that includes the hiatus between freedom from (liberation) and freedom 
to (foundation). Arendt claimed that the Greeks never really thought about this 
riddle, whereas it was the Hebrew and Roman founding legends where it had 
partially been incorporated in the occidental tradition. In Hebrew legends the 
solution was a creator God in whom time is absorbed into an atemporal founder 
of time. The creator of time is the timeless God. In Roman experience instead, 
every new beginning was thought as an improved re-statement of the old. Romans 
understood “religion as the re-ligare, to be tied back to the beginning, to remember 
again the sacredness of the beginnings.”94 According to Arendt the Roman politico-
88  “It is this faith in and hope for the world that found perhaps its most glorious and most succinct 
expression in the few words with which the Gospel announced their ‘glad tidings’: A child has been 
born to us.” Arendt, The Human Condition, 247.
89  Arendt, The Human Condition, 7.
90  Vergil, Eclogues. In Bucolics, Aeneid, and Georgics Of Vergil. Boston: Ginn & Co., 1900, IV.
91  Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Vol. 2, 212. Italics mine.
92  Arendt, The Human Condition, 195.
93  Arendt, The Human Condition, 214.




religious genius lies in the effort to think “together and combining meaningfully what 
our present vocabulary presents to us in terms of opposition and contradiction.”95 
Thus the Roman beginning connects the seemingly opposite metaphors of Janus 
and Minerva: “The most deeply Roman divinities were Janus, the god of beginning 
[…] and Minerva, the goddess of remembrance.”96 Yet, whereas Arendt’s mind 
usually works through trichotomies as we noted above, in this Roman dialectics of 
the beginning, Arendt suddenly conceals the real trichotomy, not mentioning the 
third God that was usually pictured by the side of Janus and Minerva. This God 
was of course Mars, the allegory of war, the very God to whom the military empire 
actually owed its universal glory, its great beginning, and its continuous endurance. 
In Arendt’s effort to think the beginning without violence, the Roman foundational 
ingenuity can be saved only by forgetting the divinity of Mars. 
Desert (Exercise IV)
Although Arendt did not mention the trichotomy of Janus, Minerva, and Mars, 
she however held that the Roman trichotomy of religion, tradition, and authority 
constituted the foundational heritage of the occidental tradition. And it was the 
constitutional rupture in this heritage which constituted the political crisis of the 
modern world, the crisis that she described with the metaphor of broken chain: 
“The crisis of the present world is primarily political and […] the famous ‘decline of 
the west’ consists primarily in the decline of Roman trinity of religion, tradition, and 
authority.”97 With this metaphor of a broken chain, Arendt loved to half nostalgically 
bring up two quotations from two French thinkers as crystallized announcements 
of this very crisis. The first comes from the end of De la Démocratie en Amérique, 
where Tocqueville reflected the strange daimon of the democratic world whose 
spirit is not illuminated by the past: “The past has ceased to throw its light upon 
the future, the mind of man (l’esprit) wanders in obscurity.”98 The other comes from 
Feuillet d’Hypnos, where René Char describes his experiences in the Resistance 
and which according to Arendt expressed the poet’s nostalgia towards the lost 
sphere of public action: “Our inheritance was left to us by no testament.”99
95  Hannah Arendt, On Revolution. London: Penguin Books, 1990, 224.
96  Arendt, “What is Authority”, 121.
97  Arendt, “What is Authority”, 140.
98  Alexis de Tocqueville, De la démocratie en Amérique II (1840). Troisième et quatrième parties, 
156. Une édition électronique réalisée par Jean-Marie Tremblay. Dans le cadre de la collection: “Les 
classiques des sciences socials” http://www.uqac.uquebec.ca/zone30/Classiques_des_sciences_
sociales/index.html.
99  “Notre héritage n’est précédé d’aucun testament.” Renè Char, “Feuillets d’Hypnos.” In Renè 
Char, Fureur et mystére. Paris: Gallimard, 1995, § 62, 102.
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The lost authority of the tradition, as the lost action without tradition, together 
threaten to transform the democratic daimon into the demonism of the masses 
since, according to Arendt, the experience of broken tradition uprooted men and 
transformed their old culture, the cultivated spiritual land, into a lonely desert of 
the masses of individuals. And for Arendt this desert experience of the masses 
constituted the historical condition of possibility for the totalitarian movements, 
which Arendt pictured in her mind as “sandstorms” arising in the uprooted desert. 
A way had been found to set the desert itself in motion, to let loose a sand storm that 
could cover all parts of the inhabited earth. The conditions under which we exist today 
in the field of politics are indeed threatened by these devastating sand storms.100 
These sandstorms do not shelter the rooting of the new beginnings, but instead 
threaten to ravage the whole cultivated world as we know it. Everywhere, the old 
world seems to have come to an end with the sandstorms threatening to destroy it, 
before a new beginning rising from the end of the old has had time to assert itself and 
become rooted. However, in contrast to her famous male associates working also 
as German-Jewish immigrants in the field of political thought, Arendt did not ask us 
to re-remember (anamnesis) the lost tradition as a noetic science or a “noble lie,”101 
but instead followed partly Heidegger by letting that old apocalyptic turn (trope) 
take place which Hölderlin had crystallized in his hymn Patmos: “But where there is 
danger, a rescuing element grows as well.”102 However, in Arendt’s own version this 
trope means that every end always includes the promise of the new beginning. 
Thus as the Angel of Gospel calmed down the terror of the shepherds by saying: 
“Don’t be afraid, for behold, I bring you good news of great joy which will be to all 
the people” (Luke 2:10), Arendt announces her own glad tidings at the end of her 
essay “On Ideology and Terror,” just after having described the end of the tradition 
and the spiritual desert of modern world: 
But there remains also the truth that every end in history necessarily contains a new 
beginning; this beginning is the promise, the only “message” which the end can ever 
produce. Beginning, before it becomes a historical event, is the supreme capacity of 
man; politically, it is identical with man’s freedom.103 
100  Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 478.
101  The return to the Platonic “noble lie” was the core of Leo Strauss’ esoteric answer, which in 
itself was conditioned by the very destruction of the tradition. However, we do not have space here 
to discuss the enormous complexity of Strauss’ thought, which certainly cannot itself be reduced to 
a “lie”. The return to the noetic science was Voegelin’s suggestion. In fact both of these return-calls 
were not just answers to the broken tradition but were made possible only on the basis of the broken 
tradition.
102  “Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst Das Rettende auch.” Friedrich Hölderlin, “Patmos.” In Hölderlin, 
Gedichte. Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 2000, 341.
103   Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 479.
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Yet the miracle, the rescuing child, that Arendt announces is not a new divine 
creation, but the natural fact of life itself. For here the natural birth itself grounds 
ontologically the principle of natality, which according to Arendt is capable of 
resisting the very logic of ideology and terror that tries to sublate all beginnings to 
the projected end:
The miracle that saves the world, the realm of human affairs, from its normal, “natural” 
ruin is the fact of natality, in which the faculty of action is ontologically rooted. It is, in 
other words, the birth of new men and the new beginning, the action they are capable 
of by virtue of being born.104 
The capability of beginning is the indestructible ontological fact of life, which 
in the last instance is grounded in life itself as birth. So although Arendt wanted 
to hide life itself from the public light, it was at the same time the very root of the 
capability to begin that constituted the indestructible natural remnant of man for 
her. In The Origins of Totalitarianism she even suggests that this remnant of pure 
spontaneity is included in the very animal existence of man, as she notes that 
Pavlovian experiments aimed to extinguish this natural element from the dog. Yet 
for Arendt Pavlov’s dog is a perverted animal. Natural spontaneity can be destroyed 
only in a laboratory environment, as in concentration camps: 
The camps are meant not only to exterminate people and degrade human beings, 
but also serve the ghastly experiment of eliminating, under scientifically controlled 
conditions, spontaneity itself as an expression of human behavior and of transforming 
the human personality into a mere thing, into something that even animals are not; for 
Pavlov’s dog, which as we know, was trained to eat not when it was hungry but when a 
bell rang, was a perverted animal.105 
More surprisingly, it is this biological fact that according to Arendt even guarantees 
the existence of the theological virtues of faith (pistis) and hope (elpis): 
Only the full experience of this capacity can bestow upon human affairs faith and hope, 
those two essential characteristics of human existence, which Greek antiquity ignored 
altogether, discounting the keeping of faith as a very uncommon and not too important 
virtue and counting hope among the evils of illusion in Pandora’s box.106 
So in the last instance it is a biological fact that carries the theological hope of 
new beginning beyond the authority of lost tradition. The real angelic annunciation 
is the very first cry of a child and it is this cry and not God that is “near but hard to 
104  Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 479.
105  Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 438.
106  Arendt The Human Condition, 247. Italics mine. 
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grasp.”107 As it is this annunciation (in the last instance, the cry) that should take the 
place of authority and guide us away from the desert to confront anew and without 
the shelter of tradition, the elementary problems of human life:
For to live in a political realm with neither authority nor concomitant awareness that 
the source of authority transcending power and those who are in power, means to 
be confronted anew, without the religious trust in a sacred beginning and without 
the protection of traditional and therefore self-evident standards of behavior, by the 
elementary problems of human living-together.108 
Sin (Exercise V)
At the end of “Ideology and Terror,” with her annunciation of the saving power of 
the miracle of natality, Arendt also cites her favorite quote from the De Civitate Dei 
as the everlasting principle of this hope in human affairs: “Initium ut esset homo 
creatus est – ‘that a beginning be made man was created’.”109 And until the end 
of her life she used this quote again and again to express her new thought of 
the beginning. According to Arendt, Augustine differentiates here the beginning as 
initium from the beginning as principio. Whereas principo refers to the creation of 
the universe, to the birth of the appearing world, the initium designates the birth of 
the initiative, the beginning of men as creatures who are born to begin. Thus the 
sentence annunciates again the idea that “beginning is guaranteed by each new 
birth; it is indeed every man.”110 
Of course Arendt cites the quote again out of its context, where Augustine 
actually does not affirm the creative powers of men at all, stating instead that God is 
omnipotent as the creator of souls. The riddle that Augustine tried to solve here was 
the paradoxical capacity of the eternal and timeless God to create the beginning of 
new souls, and he wanted to argue that the potentiality of God’s eternal Grace has 
indeed the actual power to interrupt the eternal pagan cycle of souls. At this point, 
when he made his attack against the “impiety of those, who assert that the souls 
which participate to the highest true blessedness must again and again in the circle 
of times return to the misery of labor (miserias laboresque redituras),”111 the Church 
Father was campaigning against those demonic pagan views that presupposed the 
107 “The God is near, and hard to grasp / Nah ist Und schwer zu fassen der Gott.” Hölderlin, 
“Patmos”, 341.
108  Arendt, “What is Authority”, 141.
109  Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 479. “Quod initium eo modo antea numquam fuit. Hoc ergo 
ut esset, creatus est homo, ante quem nullus fuit.” Augustinus, De Civitate Dei. In Aurelii Augustini 
opera, pars 14, 1–2. Corpus christianorum, Series Latina 47–8. Turnholti: Brepols, 1955, XII, 21.
110  Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 479.
111  “Iterum atque iterum per circuitus temporum miserias laboresque redituras.” Augustinus, De 
Civitate Dei, XII, 21.
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eternal circulation of the souls. Arendt, on the other hand, used the quote to affirm 
the potency of men in their shared action to create new and meaningful temporal 
events and share the blessedness of the public light that has the power to release 
men from their circling misery in labor. 
Despite this divine-secular analogy, the political message that Arendt drew from 
the quote was, however, so opposite to the message of the De Civitate Dei, that is 
seems as if Arendt had really despoiled this phrase from Augustine in order to use 
it against him.112 To be sure, De Civitate Dei was written against the poetic-political 
theology of the Roman Empire which found its expression in Virgil’s poems. For 
whereas Virgil exalted Rome as an empire without end (imperium sine fine),113 
the spiritual theology of Augustine longed for an end without end (fine sine fine), 
towards that eternal divine city which does not have any end (cuius nullus est 
finis).114 Arendt herself admits that this kind of Christian political theology denies 
the very freedom, value, and endurance of the worldly political world. In fact, 
worldly politics is here reduced to the mere task of maintaining order and discipline 
and so becomes analogous to the task of the executioner.115 And of course its 
was this cynical message of keeping order, and not the new beginning of political 
spontaneity, that formed Augustine’s politics of birth, grounded in his concept of the 
original sin (peccatum originale).
In this respect it was Carl Schmitt, the thinker of politics, in contradistinction to 
whom Arendt tried to work out her plural conceptualization of the beginning, who 
actually affirmed Augustine’s own politics of birth more consciously. For Arendt, Carl 
Schmitt was the “most able defender of sovereignty”116 and also the theoretical enemy 
who so often gave both identity and direction to Arendt’s restless effort to release 
the thinking of politics and power from sovereignty and will. However, as the more 
genuine Augustinian, Schmitt saw that the modern critique of authority and the search 
for immanent order “arises from a fanaticism whose anarchical force lies in the denial 
112  Arendt herself noted that “this concept of man as a beginning remained without consequences 
for Augustine’s political philosophy or his understanding of the civitas terrena.” Hannah Arendt, “The 
Tradition of Political Thought.” In Jerome Kohn (ed.), Hannah Arendt, The Promise of Politics. New 
York: Schocken Books, 2005, 59.
113  Vergil, Aeneid, 1. 278. 
114  Augustinus, De Civitate Dei, XXII, 30.
115  “What is harsher than an executor? What more cruel and ferocious than his character? Yet 
he holds necessary post (locus necessarium) in the very midst of laws, and he is incorporated into 
the order of well-regulated state (bene moderatae civitatis); criminal soul (animo nocens), he is 
nevertheless, by other’s arrangement, the punishment of evil-doers (poena nocens).” Augustinus, 
De Ordine, II, 4.12. In Aurelii Augustini opera, pars. 2.2. Corpus christianorum, Series Latina 29. 
Turnholti: Brepols, 1970. Translation mine. 
116  “Among the modern political theorist, Carl Schmitt is the most able defender of the notion of 
sovereignty. He recognizes clearly that the root of sovereignty is the will: Sovereign is who wills and 
commands. See especially his Verfassungslehre.” Hannah Arendt, “What is Freedom?” In Hannah 
Arendt, Between Past and Future. New York: Penguin Books, 1977, 296, note 21.
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of Original Sin.”117 Yet, Schmitt was also convinced that the old traditions of authority 
had been broken, but what was still left as the natural remnant of man, was in his 
view demonic flesh. And for Schmitt the acknowledgement of this demonism formed 
the very worldly wisdom of the great Catholic moral reason misrepresented by the 
anarchist Dostoyevsky in his cold image of the Grand Inquisitor118 – as it had been 
“the self-confident grandeur of a spiritual descendant of the Grand Inquisitors”119 that 
had made Donoso Cortés even magnify the natural evilness of man in his polemic 
“against atheist anarchism and its axiom of the good man.”120 
But even without this kind of exaggeration, the truth that remains in the secularized 
world, derived from “the theological ground dogma (Grunddogma) of the sinfulness 
of the world and man,”121 is the message of a pessimistic anthropology announcing 
the original demonism of man: “All genuine political theories presuppose man to be 
evil, i.e., by no means an unproblematic but a ‛dangerous’ and dynamic being.”122 
For Schmitt this dangerous demonism was in the last instance the only reason for 
the necessity of political authority, since otherwise this authority would really be 
purely demonic. Yet, because of the indisputable fact of the natural demonism, the 
authority is not demonic but absorbs this demonism into itself and, as a restricted 
demonism, works as the very restraining (katechon) power that holds back the 
demonism. As it holds back the demonic spirit of technology, this uncanny antichrist 
of the modern world that mistakes airplanes for angels.123 
It is in her book On Revolution where the spirit of Carl Schmitt is most intensively 
present despite his visible absence from her notes in this time.124 In fact the whole 
conservative polemics,125 which Arendt sets against the French revolution, has to 
117  Carl Schmitt, Political Romanticism. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986, 3.
118  Carl Schmitt, Römischer Katholismus und Politische Form. Stuttgart: Klett Cotta, 2004, 55.
119  Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1985, 57.
120  Schmitt, Political Theology, 57.
121  Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2002, 64.
122  Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen, 61.
123  See Carl Schmitt, Theodor Däublers ”Nordlicht”. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1990, 63.
124  From the Origins of Totalitarianism onwards Schmitt’s thinking is constantly present in Arendt’s 
political thought. Yet, it is in On Revolution that Arendt does not openly quote Schmitt at all. William 
E. Scheuerman has rightly emphasized the influence of Schmitt’s constitutional theory for Arendt’s 
(mis)reading of both the French and American Revolution. And even without having found specific 
references to the Verfassungslehre, he thinks that she may have been aware of its core claims. In fact, 
Arendt makes special reference to the Verfassungslehre in her essay “What is Freedom,” and was 
very aware of Schmitt’s overall claims. See William E. Scheuerman, “Revolutions and Constitutions: 
Hannah Arendt’s Challenge to Carl Schmitt.” In David Dyzenhaus (ed.), Law as Politics: Carl Schmitt’s 
Critique of Liberalism. Durham: Duke University Press, 1998, 272.
125  In a note on de Maistre, Arendt herself noted that “conservatism and neither liberal nor 
revolutionary thought is polemical in origin and indeed almost by definition.” Arendt, On Revolution, 
283, note 3. However, Arendt’s own reading of revolution is clearly polemical. 
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be read in the light of Schmitt’s thinking, which found “the political greatness of the 
French Revolution”126 in its united national will. Arendt, who clearly followed Schmitt’s 
interpretation by overemphasizing the role of this will in the French Revolution, 
saw in it at the same time, however, the most dangerous and apolitical element 
of revolution. Indeed, here again, far from being a good judge or theoretician of 
either the French or the American Revolution, Arendt’s creativity shows itself in her 
ability to use the revolutionary heritage as material for developing new concepts for 
the thinking of power and beginning. For it was against the decisionist miracle of 
the united constituting will and against the whole Schmittian theory of sovereignty 
and revolution that Arendt tried to launch her more plural miracle of the shared 
beginning. In this way she tried to pluralize the very concept of constituting power, 
which according to Schmitt demanded the unity of decision.
Thus, for Arendt the Grand Inquisitor is not an allegory of counter-revolution, 
but instead a parable of the motivations which led the jurist Robespierre to the 
revolutionary terror in his constitutional thought. With the Grand Inquisitor, 
Dostoyevsky shows “openly and concretely, though of course poetically and 
metaphorically, upon what tragic and self-defeating enterprise the men of the 
French Revolution had embarked.”127 Thus, if in Schmitt’s view the Greatness of the 
Catholic Inquisitors was their acknowledgement of the original sin, for Arendt the 
political “sin of the Grand Inquisitor”128 was to set abstract pity against the singular 
compassion expressed by Jesus. Yet, Arendt also claimed that compassion should 
not belong to the political sphere either. And to make this other point she used 
the image of “the angel of God” taken from Melville’s Billy Budd. For Arendt this 
was the classic story of the theoretical side of the French Revolution, since its 
lesson “followed from the reversal the men of French Revolution had made of the 
proposition of the original sin, which they had replaced by the position of original 
goodness.”129 In her view, the natural goodness as incarnated in Billy Budd can 
only come out of nowhere and be beyond virtue. And when it meets the wickedness 
beyond vice, it can only act naturally with the mute gesture of pure violence, as 
Billy Budd did. “Yet the angel must hang!”130 as the incarnation of political virtue, 
Captain Vere, declares – since, as Arendt explains, from the political perspective 
of virtue, the Angel is as much a wrongdoer:
126  “The political greatness of the French Revolution lies in the fact that despite its liberal and 
Rechsstaat principles, the thought of the French people’s political unity did not cease to be deciding 
directive even for a moment.” Carl Schmitt, Constitutional Theory. London: Duke University Press, 
2008, 102.
127  Arendt, On Revolution, 82.
128  Arendt, On Revolution, 85.
129  Arendt, On Revolution, 87.
130  Arendt, On Revolution, 84.
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The tragedy is that the law is made for men, and neither for angels nor devils. Laws and 
lasting institutions break down not only under the onslaught of elemental evil but under 
the impact of absolute innocence as well.131 
Hence, what was for Schmitt the core question of every political idea, the natural 
goodness or evilness of man,132 is barred from Arendt’s virtuous political realm, 
which lies beyond the mute expressions of the good and evil. Therefore, neither 
the image of the original sin nor original goodness can offer foundational support 
to the political realm that would equally exclude both satanic violence and the mute 
angelic gestures of absolute goodness. 
It is true that before her so called political awakening, in her early dissertation 
on St. Augustine, Arendt had still claimed that the original sin constituted the very 
basis of the worldly love where “a community-in-sinfulness” grounds the third love, 
that of one’s neighbor: 
Humanity’s common descent is its common share in original sin. This sinfulness 
conferred with birth, necessarily attaches to everyone. There is no escape from it. It is 
the same in all people. The equality of the situation means that all are sinful. ”The whole 
world was guilty from Adam.”133 
But as early as in The Origins of Totalitarianism, natural birth is no longer 
an equalizing but a differentiating factor that shows itself in political life as “the 
disturbing miracle contained in the fact that each of us is made as he is – single, 
unique, unchangeable.”134 Natural birth no longer grounds common equality, 
resisting and disturbing instead the artificial equality that is able to shine only in 
the public sphere. And yet, as we have argued all along, it still works as the silent 
ontological condition for the spontaneity of public speech and action. 
Mysteries (Exercise VI)
Now, Augustine’s political theology of birth and death not only distinguished 
between the birth of the world (principo) and of the souls (initium), but also 
differentiated the second, spiritual birth and death from the primal natural ones. 
Whereas the natural birth and death were tied to carnal equality, the spiritual birth 
and death were connected to spiritual differentiation, to the last judgment and 
131  Arendt, On Revolution, 84.
132  “Every political idea in one way or another takes a position on the ‘nature’ of man and presupposes 
that he is either ‘by nature good’ or ‘by nature evil’.” Carl Schmitt, Political Theology, 56.
133  Hannah Arendt, Love and Saint Augustine. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996, 
102. 
134  Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 301.
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divine grace. And in Augustine’s peculiar soteriological scheme the unforeseen 
grace would in the end of the world save even the material body with the absolution 
of all carnality from the carnal, thus purifying the demonic passions from the 
purely angelic body of the arisen.135 
Now, we find the distinction between two deaths and births also in Arendt, who 
was here influenced by Martin Heidegger. However it was from Augustine that 
the young Heidegger had in turn assumed the troubled (molestia) and restless 
experience of care (cura) as the fundamental experience of temporal facticity of 
life.136 But in his passionate and demonic reading of Augustine Heidegger omitted 
the angelic existence of beautitudo towards which Augustine’s thought had striven, 
as an erroneous Neoplatonic influence. And what remained of this non-Neoplatonic 
Augustine, was only the Christian passion, the experience of factical life, which 
Heidegger further reduced to the temporal tension of the mundane troubled human 
condition. In fact, Augustine himself had made the very opposite criticism of 
Neoplatonism, claiming that it is not the Platonic daimons that can steer us towards 
beautitudo but only the good angels, since the souls of daimons are agitated by 
the whirlwinds and tempests of passions.137 And because the daimons share these 
passions with men, whereas pious men share with the angels the light of reason, 
the “men are to be put before demons because their despair is not to be compared 
to the hope of pious men.”138 
As had Carl Schmitt, also Martin Heidegger saved only the demonic experience 
from Augustine. For Heidegger, however, this was not the moral experience of 
evilness of man, but a more primordial experience of the potentiality-for Being-
guilty (Schuldigseinkönnen), disclosed by the resolute experience of one’s 
ownmost mortality as being towards the end (Sein zum Ende). It is this experience 
that retains the temporal structure of Augustine’s experience of soteriological time, 
yet not as the hope of a future angelic beutitudo, but as an anticipatory possibility 
of the non-relational impossibility: “Thus death reveals itself as one’s own most 
(eigenste), non-relational (unbezügliche) not outstripped possibility (unüberholbare 
135  See Augustine, Enchiridion de Fide, Spe et Charitate liber unus. In J. P. Migne (ed.), Patrologia 
Latina, vol. 40.
136  Martin Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2004, § 17. “Also this interpretation of dasein based on the phenomenon of care is not an invention 
of mine […]. It was seven years ago, while I was investigating these structures in conjunction with 
my attempts to arrive at the ontological foundations of Augustinian anthropology, that I first came 
across the phenomenon of care.” Martin Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992, 301–2.
137  “animi daemonum passionum turbelis et tempestatibus agitentur.” Augustine, De Civitate Dei, 
VIII, 15.
138  “Quoniam spei piorum hominum nequaquam illorum desperatio conparanda est.” Augustine, De 
Civitate Dei, VIII, 15. 
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Möglichkeit).”139 Of course, Heidegger’s existential (second) dying in its difference 
from mere natural perishing (nur-verenden) does not, as Augustinian spiritual 
“second” death, send the sinner to burn in the eternal hell, demanding instead, 
with a burning worldly angst, one to realize one’s ownmost possibilities in this life. 
And what calls forth from this “death” is not the mysterious divine judgment of an 
unforeseen Grace but only the silent call of Gewissen as the empty inner daimon of 
Dasein. “The call of inner daimon (ruft das Gewissen) says nothing (nichts).”140
According to Arendt, it was the demonic call for passionate thinking without 
other end than thinking itself that made Heidegger “the secret king, who reigns 
in the realm of thought”141 and made his name fly as Fama all over Germany,142 
blasting out its redemptive glad tidings: “thinking is alive again.”143 It was the 
passion for thinking, as much as the personal passion for a thinker, which Arendt 
received from her lifelong romance with Heidegger. And she was even ready to 
believe that it was mainly the Romantic “delusions of genius”144 which made this 
passionate thought of demonic homelessness (unheimlich) grotesquely mistake 
the political gestures of Führer’s “miraculous hands”145 for a silent national home 
call.146 As it was because of her fidelity to passion that the “girl from abroad”147 was 
ready to make a reconciliation and forgive the national delusions of a thinker who 
139  Martin Heidegger, Being and Time. Oxford: Blackwell, 1978, 294. Translation modified. Martin 
Heidegger, Sein und Zeit. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1993, § 50, 250. 
140  “Der Ruf sagt nichts aus, gibt keine Auskunft über Weltereignisse, hat nichts zu erzählen.“ 
Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, § 50, 250. 
141  Arendt’s letter 166 for Heidegger including her birthday speech for Heidegger. In Hannah 
Arendt & Martin Heidegger, Briefe 1925 bis 1975 und andere Zeugnisse. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio 
Klostermann, 2002, 182. Translation mine. 
142  “Little more than a name was known, but the name made its way through all of Germany like the 
rumour of the secret king.” Arendt & Heidegger, Briefe, b. 116, 180. Translation in Hannah Arendt and 
Martin Heidegger, Letters 1925–1975. London: Harcourt, 1998, 149.
143  “The rumor put it quite simply; thinking is alive again.” Arendt & Heidegger, Briefe, b. 116, 182. 
Translation in Arendt and Heidegger, Letters 1925–1975, 151.
144  Or this is what Arendt wrote in 1956, just after the world and before their new reconciliation. 
“Heidegger is really (let us hope) the last Romantic […] whose complete lack of responsibility is 
attributable to a spiritual playfulness that stems in part from delusions of genius and in part from 
despair.” Hannah Arendt, “What is existential Philosophy.” In Jerome Kohn (ed.), Hannah Arendt: 
Essays in Understanding 1930–1954. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1994, 187, note 2. 
145  According to Jaspers this was Heidegger’s answer to him when he worried about Hitler’s lack of 
culture: “Culture does not matter. Just look at his marvelous hands!” (“Bildung ist ganz gleichgültig, 
sehen Sie nur seine wunderbaren Hände an!”) Karl Jaspers, Philosophische Autobiographie. 
München: Piper, 1977, 101.
146  “The problem was not what our enemies did but what our friend did […] they made up ideas 
about Hitler, in part terrifically interesting things! Things above ordinary level. I found that grotesque.” 
Hannah Arendt, “What remains? Language Remains”, 11.
147  “I have never considered myself a German woman, and have long since stopped considering 
myself a Jewish woman. I feel just like what I am now, after all, the girl from abroad.” Arendt & 
Heidegger, Briefe, b. 48, 76. Translation in Arendt and Heidegger, Letters 1925–1975, 60.
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answered her with a poem: “Stranger from abroad, live in beginning.”148 And surely, 
Arendt never gave up the passionate thinking of the beginning, starting her birthday 
speech “Martin Heidegger at 80” with the quote from Plato: “For beginning that 
dwells among men is divinity that saves everything.”149 However, for Heidegger, 
who always tried to begin thought again from its very beginning, beginning always 
means thinking through the end. Whereas from the very beginning, Arendt wanted 
rather to think the end through the beginning and so favor the birthday deities over 
the angels of death in the experience of human “historicity.” 
St. Augustine had written that the life of mortals should rather be called 
death than life since our lifetime is nothing but a race towards death (cursus ad 
mortem) and that as soon as we begin to live we begin to die.150 In his Sein und 
Zeit Heidegger cited this Christian truism from a late medieval poem by Johannes 
von Templ, where the figure of Death gives lessons to the Bohemian Ploughman, 
who is mourning the death of his worldly love: “As soon as a human has life, he 
is old enough to die.”151 But at the end of the same lessons Death also warns 
the Ploughman about woman’s vanity: “Have you not read where Hermes, the 
sage, teaches that a man should beware of beautiful women.”152 This, however, 
Heidegger did not cite, even though he had written that vanity meant dwelling 
in the present for the sake of the present and thus belonged to the inauthentic 
temporality of falling as the very counter-phenomenon of the authentic moment of 
vision given by the existential lessons of Death.153 However, it was the beauty and 
greatness (Schönheit und Größe) of the young Arendt, which once in a rainstorm 
in Marburg had, as moment of vision (Augenblick), struck the Ploughman of Being 
as demonic and had never since left his thought: “Beloved Hannah! The demonic 
(dämonische) struck me.”154 
Arendt herself, of course, never accepted the lessons of Death, but openly 
defended vanity as an authentic principle of shared life, writing that: “a life without 
[…] vanity […] is literally dead world; it has ceased to be human life because it 
148  From Heidegger poem to Arendt: Das Mädchen aus der Fremde. Arendt & Heidegger, Briefe, b. 
50, 80.
149  “Archê gar kai theos en anthrôpois hidrumenê sôzei panta.” Plato, Leges, 755a. In Platonis 
Opera – recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit Ioannes Burnet. Tomus V, pars II. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1937.
150  Augustine, De Civitate Dei, XIII, 10.
151  “Als schiere ein mensche lebendig wirt, als schiere ist es alt genug zu sterben.” Johannes von 
Tepl, “Der Ackermann aus Böhmen.” Der TOT, XX. Heidegger quotes: “Sobald ein Mensch zum 
Leben kommt, sogleich ist er alt genug zu sterben.” Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, § 48, 245.
152  “Hastu nicht gelesen, wie Hermes, der weissage, lernet, wie sich ein man huten sol vor schonen 
weiben.” Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, § 48, 245.
153  Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, § 68 c.
154  Arendt & Heidegger, Briefe, b. 3, 14.
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is no longer lived among men.”155 And it was the very virtues of the vanishing 
temporality that Arendt’s natal thought set against the traditional philosophical 
thought of mortality. However, this thought of natality seemed to follow the 
very same structure as Heidegger’s thought of mortality. Thus, for Arendt, birth 
constitutes one’s ownmost and impossible possibility which no-one can take from 
the other. And whereas for Heidegger the courage before death makes possible 
the resolute decision in life and frees one to act, for Arendt the courage before birth 
makes possible the free initiation into the public sphere: “Courage liberates men 
from their worry about life for the freedom of the world. Courage is indispensable 
because in politics not life but the world is at stake.”156 And as for Heidegger the 
resolute courage is not courage in face of natural death, also for Arendt the first 
birth takes place in mute darkness, whereas it is only the “second birth, in which 
we confirm and take upon ourselves the naked fact of our physical appearance.”157 
Lastly, parallel to Heidegger, to whom the call of death is silent, the birth is a mute 
mystical experience for Arendt, lying beyond the sphere of speech: “Because man 
does not know where he comes from when he is born and where he goes when 
he dies.”158 In fact, it is in the case of birth and death that Arendt refers to the most 
sublime and mysterious rituals known in the Ancient World: 
Eleusinian Mysteries […] concerned the unspeakable and experiences beyond speech 
were non-political and perhaps unpolitical by definition. That they concerned the secret 
of the birth and death seems proved by fragment of Pindar: oide men biou teleutan, 
oiden de diosdoton archan.159 
According to Arendt, “conceptually, we may call truth what we cannot change, 
metaphorically, it is the ground on which we stand and the sky that stretches above 
us.”160 And to be sure, for Arendt the natural birth is our silent ground and mystical 
truth, which does not belong to the revelation made in public speech but which 
nonetheless ontologically grounds our political actions as their hidden truth that 
can be experienced only in unspoken wonderment: “Truth, be it ancient truth of 
Being or the Christian truth of the living God, can reveal itself only in complete 
155  Arendt, The Human Condition, 176.
156  Arendt, “What is Freedom”, 156.
157  Arendt, The Human Condition, 176. “In modern times it is not uncommon to find people holding, 
with Schopenhauer, that our mortality is the eternal source of philosophy, that ‘death actually is 
eternal source of philosophy [and that] without death there would scarcely be any philosophizing.’ 
Even the younger Heidegger of Sein und Zeit still treated the anticipation of death as the decisive 
experience trough which man can attain an authentic self.” Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Vol. 1, 79. 
158  Arendt, The Human Condition, 63.
159  Arendt, The Human Condition, 63.
160  Hannah Arendt, “Truth and Politics.” In Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future. New York: 
Penguin Books, 1977, 264.
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human stillness.”161 In the words of young Wittgenstein, a birth is the inexpressible 
(Unaussprechliches), it “shows itself; it is mystical.”162 Or as Arendt herself writes: 
This mere existence, that is, all that which is mysteriously given us by birth and which 
includes the shape of our bodies and the talents of our minds, can be adequately dealt 
with only by the unpredictable hazards of friendship and sympathy, or by the great and 
incalculable grace of love, which says with Augustine, volo ut sis (I want you to be) 
without being able to give an particular reason for such supreme and unsurpassable 
affirmation.163 
But when Arendt quoted volo ut sis, as the unconditional affirmation and 
mysterious gratitude for the given, she was not actually quoting Augustine, since 
the phrase does not appear verbatim in his writings. Instead, she was quoting 
Heidegger, who sent her this quote – which Arendt kept as a “deep secret/
pregnancy (geheimnis)”164 in her soul – in reference to their passionate love. 
According to Heidegger this love had forced them into their ownmost existence 
(eigenste Existenz), after Arendt had “become a saint (Heilige)”165 by having stood 
“completely revealed (offenbar)”166 for the philosopher, who could only write: 
This time all words fail me – and I can only cry and cry – and the why cannot be 
answered either – it sinks – waiting in vain – in thanks and faith. ”Now I will do what the 
angel bids.”167
The Archeology (Exercise VII)
But although the naked existence and birth in itself is for Arendt the unspeakable 
and mysterious natural truth, it is redeemed only in its revelation in speech, i.e. in 
that “second birth, in which we confirm and take upon ourselves the naked fact of 
our physical appearance.”168 For contrary to the catholic conservatives, such as 
Schmitt and Voegelin, Arendt affirms the possibility of worldly political salvation. 
This happens when the expression of the “who” in public speech and action 
redeems the silent mysteries of “what” given us in birth: 
161  Arendt, The Human Condition, 15. 
162  “Es gibt allerdings Unaussprechliches. Dies zeigt sich, es ist das Mystische.” Ludvig Wittgenstein, 
Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1984, 6.522.
163  Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 301.
164  Arendt & Heidegger, Briefe, b. 18, 33. Translation mine.
165  Arendt & Heidegger, Briefe, b. 15, 31. Transl. in Arendt and Heidegger, Letters 1925–1975, 20.
166  Arendt & Heidegger, Briefe, b. 15, 30. Transl. in Arendt and Heidegger, Letters 1925–1975, 20.
167  Arendt & Heidegger, Briefe, b. 15, 30. Transl. in Arendt and Heidegger, Letters 1925–1975, 20.
168  Arendt, The Human Condition, 176.
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This disclosure of who somebody is, is implicit in both his words and his deeds […] 
the affinity between speech and revelation is much closer than between action and 
revelation, just as the affinity between action and beginning is closer than between 
speech and beginning, although many, and even the most acts, are performed in the 
manner of speech.169 
In this way Arendt can claim that it is actually revelation in speech and not the 
mystical birth that constitutes the proper beginning in the human affairs. She states 
that this is crystallized in the first announcement of the Gospel of John: en archê 
ên ho logos.170 Thus it is again the Christian announcement of the New Testament 
that Arendt sets against the message of the Old Testament, where “Cain slew Abel 
and Romulus slew Remus; violence was the beginning and, by same token, no 
beginning could be made without using violence, without violating.”171 According to 
Arendt, “violence is by nature instrumental”172 and cannot properly begin anything. 
It needs a justified goal, but cannot form a founding power or ground any founding 
as legitimate.173 The critique of founding violence is of course directed against the 
Weberian definition of the state as the political entity that is defined through its 
specific means (spezifischen Mittel), i.e., its capability to hold a regional monopoly 
over legitimate physical violence.174 But it is still more clearly turned against Schmitt, 
who in his criticism of the Weberian statist definition of politics attached politics 
even more firmly to the existential possibility of violence, i.e. to the intensity of the 
distinction between friend and enemy. For Schmitt, the very parable of Cain and Abel 
from the Old Testament crystallized the world historical tension that arises necessarily 
from the demonic violence and not from angelic revelation.175 Against this demonic 
genealogy of violence Arendt created her own political gospel of the beginning as an 
angelic archeology, i.e. the discourse (logos) of beginning (archê).
But also this archeology includes its own specific tension between the beginning 
as foundation and preservation, between pure spontaneity and endurance, 
169  Arendt, The Human Condition, 178.
170  In the beginning was the Word (John 1:1). “The conviction, in the beginning was a crime – for 
which the phrase ‘state of nature’ is only a theoretically purified paraphrase – has carried through 
the centuries no less self-evident plausibility for the state of human affairs than the first sentence 
of St John, In the beginning was the Word, has possessed for the affairs of salvation.” Arendt, On 
Revolution, 20. 
171  Arendt, On Revolution, 20.
172  Hannah Arendt, On Violence. San Diego: A Harvest Book, 1970, 51.
173  Arendt, On Violence, 51. 
174  Max Weber, “Politik als Beruf.” In Gesammelte Politische Schriften. Potsdam: Institut für 
Pädagogik der Universität Potsdam, 1999, 397.
175  “Adam and Eve had two sons, Cain and Abel. This is how the history of humanity begins. This 
is what the father of all things looks like. Here is the dialectical tension that keeps world history in 
motion – and the world history has not yet come to its end.” Carl Schmitt, Ex Captivitate Salus. Köln: 
Greven Verlag, 1950, 90. Cited in Mika Ojakangas, “Carl Schmitt’s Real Enemy: The Citizen of the 
Non-exclusive Democratic Community?” The European Legacy, Vol. 8, No 4, 2003.
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between initium and principium. For the pure affirmation of the initium, which in the 
last instance guarantees the existence of natural spontaneity, does not yet solve 
the problem of the beginning (principio) of the world, since in the world an action 
can survive only by its endurance in a further, common action. And Arendt holds 
that this tension of the beginning was articulated in its “classical clarity” in ancient 
Greek and Latin, where there were two verbs that designated “what we uniformly 
call ‛to act’.”176 These words were: 
arhei, to begin, to lead and finally to rule, and prattein, to carry something through, 
[and] agere, to set something in motion; and gerere, […] the enduring and supporting 
continuation of past acts.177 
The proper condition for political freedom and action is in Arendt’s view this 
archeology of beginning and enduring, since political action is not a phenomenon 
of the will but constituted by the capability “to call something into being which did 
not exist before,”178 and at the same time, to make that beginning endure in a further 
action. In its turn the endurance of beginning is guaranteed by its principles, since 
“what saves the act of beginning from its own arbitrariness is that it carries its own 
principle within itself.”179 Thus even though proper political action is “neither under 
the guidance of the intellect nor under the dictate of the will,”180 it is still illuminated 
by the light of inspiring principles. These principles are virtues like “the honor or 
glory, love of equality,”181 manifesting the universal and inexhaustible guiding spirits 
of the performing action. 
In fact, these inspiring and guiding principles are those very powers and virtues 
(Potestatum et Virtutum) which the Christian angelology of Pseudo-Dionysius 
situated in the middle order of celestial intelligences designating powerful and 
unshakable virilities (incommutabilem virilitatem).182 But if for Dionysius this angelic 
virility emanated from the supreme divine power, according to Arendt the virility of 
these principles, which constitutes the middle order of worldly action, radiates only 
from the virtuous performance itself and only as long as this performance lasts. 
The performance itself constitutes the political history of mankind as a series of 
unexpected acts. And this angelic “chain of miracles”183 can heal the “broken chain” 
176  Arendt, “What is Freedom”, 165. 
177  Arendt, “What is Freedom”, 165.
178  Arendt, “What is Freedom”, 151.
179  Arendt, On Revolution, 212.
180  Arendt, “What is Freedom”, 152.
181  Arendt, “What is Freedom”, 152.
182  See Dionysius the Areopagite, Celestial Hierarchy. In The Works of Dionysius the Areopagite, 
vol. 2. London: James Parker & Co, 1897, chap. VIII.
183  Arendt, “What is Freedom”, 169.
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of the lost tradition, but only if the links of the chain connecting the miraculous voids 
of virtuosity are forged from the inexhaustible virtues, i.e. the angelic powers of 
enduring principles. It is this second birth, the rebirth into the radiance of enduring 
angelic publicity of the changeable human world, which redeems the silent mysteries 
and unchangeable truths of the first births and cries.
The Child (Exercise VIII)
However, life and love as such are not redeemed in this publicity, since in their 
singular existence they cannot transform themselves into shining angelic virtues, 
remaining instead hidden divine mysteries. Heidegger’s Volo ut sis was indeed for 
Arendt the highest affirmation of love, which she even compared to the love of God, 
who loves his creatures unconditionally and “without desiring them,”184 i.e. loves 
them as parents love their children. Or as Heidegger loved her “girlish essence”185 
as Arendt’s singular enduring strength: “Child – you have now attained all that 
again and will never loose it. You will have your childhood no longer as mere gift of 
nature, but as the ground of your soul and the strength of your being.”186 Whereas 
Arendt always affirmed the spontaneous beginning as the strength of childhood 
and up until her last writings agreed with Duns Scotus that the mental faculty of will 
that could freely and spontaneously assert the affirmation of love was in its very 
groundlessness the most godlike faculty of man.187 
But meanwhile she had also become convinced that this godlike mental faculty 
of beginning should belong as little to the mature political sphere as children, girlish 
students, or romantic philosophers. Not only because for her “politics is not like the 
nursery”188 but also because political freedom is not born from the mental freedom 
of the will with its principium individuationis, but from the shared capability of power 
with its plural principles. And where the experiences of power as ability are the 
original Greek political experiences, the experiences of volition, “Hebrew in origin, 
were not political and did not relate to the world.”189 Yet the very difference between 
Hebrew volition and Greek power can be discovered only in their common mixture, 
184  “The willing ego when it says its highest manifestation, ‘Amo: Volo ut sis’, ‘I love you; I want you 
to be’ – and not ‘I want to have you’ or ‘I want to rule you’ – shows itself capable of the love with which 
supposedly God loves men, whom he created only because He willed them to exist and whom he 
loves without desiring them.” Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Vol. 2, 136.
185  Arendt & Heidegger, Briefe, b. 1, 12. Translation mine.
186  Arendt & Heidegger, Briefe, b. 19, 35. Translation in Arendt and Heidegger, Letters 1925–1975, 
24.
187  “The miracle of human mind is that by virtue of the Will it can transcend everything […] and this 
is the sign of man’s being created in God’s image.” Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Vol. 2, 136.
188  Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, 279.
189  Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Vol. 2, 63.
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in the Hellenistic Christian experience of St. Paul, who uncovered with his “I will but 
cannot,” that “to will” and “to be able” are not the same. Whereas it was Augustine 
– “the first Christian” and “the only philosopher the Romans never had”190 – who in 
his inner struggle with this mental experience found the autonomous faculty of will 
and thus became “the first philosopher of the will.”191 
But as much as Arendt would praise this Christian discovery as the very discovery 
of the mental organ of spontaneous beginning, it remained for her apolitical as an 
inner mental disposition and isolated philosophical experience. And yet she also 
claimed that beside the Christian, inner mental struggles, we can find in Augustine 
a more Roman and hence, political experience of freedom as well: 
In his only political treatise, In De civitate Dei […] Augustine […] speaks more from the 
background of specifically Roman experiences […] and freedom is conceived there not 
as an inner human disposition but as a character of human existence in the world.192 
This more political experience of the beginning is not found in lonely mental 
struggles, but in the already mentioned Augustinian philosophy of birth, where the 
concept of initium affirms the birth of each man as an initial beginning because “in 
each instance something new comes into an already existing world.”193 Indeed, Arendt 
keeps insisting that Augustine should be seen as a positive thinker of birth, even if in 
fact it is hard to find a thinker more hostile to man’s natal condition. For Augustine the 
natural birth and infancy are demonic phenomena even worse than death: 
For who would not shrink from the alternative, and elect to die, if it were proposed to 
him either to suffer death or to be again an infant? Our infancy, indeed, introducing us 
to this life not with laughter but with tears, seems unconsciously to predict the ills we 
are to encounter. Zoroaster alone is said to have laughed when he was born, and that 
unnatural (monstrosus) omen portended no good to him.194 
But whereas the image of a laughing child was a monstrous omen for 
Augustine, in his Also sprach Zarathustra Nietzsche used the same image as a 
positive metaphor for the supreme affirmation of life as innocence of all becoming. 
Arendt, who noticed the strange similarity between Nietzsche’s and Augustine’s 
conceptions of the will argued, however, that about Augustine’s conception 
“Nietzsche certainly knew nothing.”195 But in fact Nietzsche knew it very well, and 
190  Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Vol. 2, 84. 
191  Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Vol. 2, 84–110.
192  Arendt, “What is Freedom”, 167.
193  Arendt, “What is Freedom”, 167.
194  Augustine, De Civitate Dei, XXI, 14. Translation in St. Augustin’s City of God and Christian 
Doctrine URL: http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf102.html.
195  Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Vol. 2, 161.
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his great philosophic-poetic work reads as an anti-Augustinian treatise that fully 
consciously sets the rhythm of Dionysian dithyrambs against Augustine’s temporal 
salvation hymns, i.e. against all those Preachers of Death that “hardly are born 
when they begin to die.”196 As Arendt herself noted, Nietzsche’s “shift from the I-will 
to the anticipated I-can, which negates the Pauline I-will-and-I-cannot and thereby 
all Christian ethics, is based on an unqualified Yes to Life.”197 
And it is clearly Nietzsche who sets the philosophy of innocent birth against 
Augustine’s inborn guilt. In Nietzsche’s gospel of the cosmic child, the anxiety of 
Christian guilt and resentment are overcome by the natural innocence of becoming 
itself: “Innocence is the child, and forgetfulness, a new beginning, a play, a self-
rolling wheel, a first movement, a holy Yes-saying.”198 This glad tiding redeems 
the greatest weight (Das grösste Schwergewicht) that is included in the “thought 
experience”199 performed by the malicious demon in Gay Science.200 Also Arendt 
noted that “Innocence of the Becoming” is not “drawn from a mental faculty [but] 
rooted in the fact that we indeed are ‘thrown’ into the world.”201 However, in the 
case of Nietzsche, she did not accept this childish celebration of birth, but suddenly 
saw it as being even more Christian (apolitical) than Augustine’s supposed 
Roman celebration of initiation. For she claimed that in spite of the pagan clothes, 
Nietzsche’s anti-Christian demon that affirms life itself as the highest good is in fact 
deeply Christian. Thus Nietzsche, the self-appointed anti-Christ, would be the anti-
Christ in a properly Christian sense, as the best imitator of Christ: 
The reason why life asserted itself as the ultimate point of reference in the modern age and 
has remained the highest good of modern society is that the modern reversal operated 
within the fabric of a Christian society whose fundamental belief in the sacredness of 
life has survived, and even remained completely unshaken by, secularization and the 
general decline of Christian faith. […] [It is] the undisputable fact that only when the 
196  Friedrich Nietzsche, Also sprach Zarathustra. In Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe 
(KSA) 4. München: DTV, 1999, I, § 9.
197  Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Vol. 2, 163.
198  “Unschuld ist das Kind und Vergessen, ein Neubeginnen, ein Spiel, ein aus sich rollendes Rad, 
eine erste Bewegung, ein heiliges Ja-sagen.” Nietzsche, Also sprach Zarathustra, I, § 1, 31, 7–9.
199  For Arendt calls it a thought experience that implies the experimental return to the ancient 
concept of cyclical time that challenges the very notion of Will, whose project assumes rectilinear 
time. Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Vol. 2, 166.
200  “What, if some day or night a demon were to steal into your loneliest loneliness and say to you: 
‘This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once again and innumerable times 
again; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh 
and everything unspeakably small or great in your life must return to you, all in the same succession 
and sequence – even this spider and this moonlight between the trees, and even this moment and 
I myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is turned over again and again and you with it, speck 
of dust!’ Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke 
thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment when you would have answered him: 
‘You are a God, never have I heard anything more divine!’” Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, § 341, 194.
201  Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Vol. 2, 170.
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immortality of individual life became the central creed of Western mankind, that is, only 
with the rise of Christianity, did life on earth also become the highest good of man.202 
However, according to Arendt it was not only Nietzsche who equates Life and 
Being with his Ewige Wiederkunft, but this equation is made also by Bergson with 
his L’Evolution créatrice and Marx with his Stoffwechsel mit der Natur. It is this 
equation that makes these three thinkers the three greatest representatives of 
modern life philosophy, itself born from the secularized Christian idea.203 But she 
goes even further to assert that this celebration of the “sheer bliss of being alive – 
love of life – laboring and consuming, with happy and purposeless regularity,”204 was 
not only a secularized Christian idea, but the very experience of the Old testament: 
“The Old Testament […] held life to be sacred and […] neither dead nor labor to 
be evil.”205 And in the modern world where the shining experience of the shared 
world was itself at stake, was it only the sacredness of life, the labor of life, and the 
natural cycle of births and deaths that seemed to remain? Against this demonic 
cycle of life (zoe) Arendt invented his own airy and aeonic angelology based on the 
ever appearing and disappearing life-duration (aion) of the biographical life (bios). 
Appearance (Exercise IX)
This political angelology does not equate being and life, but instead states that 
“being and appearing coincide.”206 Thus according to the transcendental aesthetics 
of this appearing being, the beginning arises from non-appearance, literally out of 
nowhere. “The beginning has, as it were, nothing whatsoever to hold on to; it is 
as though it came out of nowhere in either time or space.”207 But whereas in the 
sphere of life itself (zoe), the appearance and disappearance of life belongs to the 
natural cycle of life and death, it is only in the aeonic vertical life, in the life of the 
linear aion (which in medieval theology was associated with the angelic life) that 
the proper human appearance in the world takes place. This linear life (bios) – “with 
recognizable life-story from birth to death”208 – arises from the cyclical life (zoe) and 
“by the rectilinear course of its movement […] cuts through the circular movement 
202  Arendt, The Human Condition, 313–316.
203  “The greatest representatives of modern life philosophy are Marx, Nietzsche and Bergson, 
inasmuch as all three equate Life and Being.” Arendt, The Human Condition, 313.
204  Arendt, The Human Condition, 106.
205  Arendt, The Human Condition, 197.
206  Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Vol. 1, 11.
207  Arendt, On Revolution, 206.
208  Arendt, The Human Condition, 19.
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of biological life.”209 Yet from the perspective of this rectilinear appearance it is 
not only life itself (zoe) that forms a cyclical circle, but also the pure thought (nûs) 
detaches itself from the line of appearance and circles around itself. If we were 
to make a sketch of this trilogy of life forms, there would be the lifeless circle of 
thought (Apollo) that cuts the linear appearance from above and the deathless 
repetition of life (Dionysius) that cuts it from below. And between these demonic 
circles Arendt sets the sphere of the world as the rectilinear space for the enduring 
appearance of men. (See diagram.) 
Picture 1.
In the Human Condition, Arendt’s priority was to save this enduring appearance 
of men from the cycles of life itself (zoe), whereas in The Life of the Mind she 
concentrated more fully on the relation that the spiritual sphere of mind had with 
temporal appearance. According to her, the experience of this relation is crystallized 
in Kafka’s late little story called Er (He), which she had used as the guiding spirit 
of her untimely reflections in Between Past and Future. She had also send this 
aphorism to Heidegger, who claimed to have agreed with Arendt’s interpretation 
if one just kept in mind that the time-space it describes cannot be considered 
209  Arendt, The Human Condition, 19.
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something extra-temporal or extra-spatial.210 For Arendt, Kafka was a writer who 
used thinking for struggle211 and “Er” was a story that tried to narrate the experience 
of the very struggle that thinking itself faces with time. 
Kafka, by sheer force of intelligence and spiritual imagination, created out of a bare ‘abstract’ 
minimum of experience of a kind of thought-landscape which, without losing in precision, 
harbors all the riches, varieties, and dramatic elements characteristic of ‛real’ life.212 
According to Arendt, Kafka’s “Er” parable “analyzes poetically our inner state 
in regard to the time, of which we are aware when we have withdrawn from the 
appearances and find our mental activities recoiling characteristically upon 
themselves.”213 The moment in which this spiritual sphere of inner time sensation 
manifests itself is the nunc stans, the standing moment as a gap of time where two 
antagonistic forces battle; other coming from the infinite future and other from the 
infinite past. Now, if we situate this “parallelogram of force” in the above mentioned 
political trilogy of life forms, we can see that here the eternal cycle of life and its 
fertile potentiality belong as the sphere of “physics” to the lower side of the battle-
field. Whereas the potentiality of thought (and it is only from here that the gap can 
be sensed as a struggle between past and future) takes place just above the battle, 
opening towards the “track of non-time” and towards “metaphysics.” (See diagram.)
 
Picture 2.
210  Arendt & Heidegger, Briefe, b. 99, 162.
211  See Arendt’s 1944 essay, where Kafka is represented as a conscious pariah who uses thinking 
as his weapon. Hannah Arendt, “The Jew as Pariah: A Hidden Tradition.” In J. Kohn and H Feldman 
(eds.), Hannah Arendt: The Jewish Writings. New York: Schocken Books, 2007. On Arendt’s early 
interpretations of Kafka see also her 1946 essay. Hannah Arendt, “Franz Kafka, Appreciated Anew.”
212  See Arendt, Between Past and Future, 10.
213  Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Vol. 1, 202. 
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What cuts here into the linear course of appearing life, is not only the physical 
birth arising from the cycle of life (zoe), but also the spiritual judgments emanating 
from the space of thought. Again this thought space is itself divided according to 
a trilogy of faculties, i.e., thought, will, and judgment. But whereas the faculty of 
thought opens towards atemporal infinity, the faculties of will and judgment intend 
towards the temporal lines of past and future. The anticipating will turns towards 
the future and the judging judgment turns towards the past. 
Although Arendt claims that the thought space is always tied to the temporal 
succession of appearances, she also argues that these faculties in themselves 
(thought, will and judgment) are spiritually self-contained and autonomous.214 In 
the last instance they are ends in themselves, nothing but pure (haplos) faculties. 
For it is reason’s own need to think that is the beginning and the end of thinking, 
and “nothing other than the Will is the total cause of volition.”215 Lastly, judgment is 
pure when it realizes that it cannot depend on any rule and discovers the pleasure 
of judgment in itself. But why does Arendt posit these purely angelic, spiritual 
faculties, which are pure (haplos) and self-contained as Plato’s gods?216 Nietzsche 
would certainly protest here, claiming that this is nothing but pseudo-theological 
thought trying to pass judgment on life. According to Nietzsche, we should instead 
judge the angelic faculties from the perspective of living and not set about again 
on “the honeymoon of German philosophy” when “all the young theologians of 
the Tübingen seminary ran off into the bushes – all looking for ’faculties’.”217 For 
Nietzsche the whole idea of specific faculties was tautological, since it explained 
a particular potentiality by making it a particular potentiality (faculty). Hence we 
should not ask how faculties are possible, but why we should believe in them in 
the first place. And for Nietzsche, the faculties were invented only for the purposes 
of preserving beings of our kind. They were in fact false judgments belonging only 
to the perspectives of the living. Those that went searching for faculties confused 
inventing and discovering, since the faculty of will was not discovered but invented 
for the sake of punishment. 
Arendt however claimed that in The Life of the Mind she was writing the very 
history of the faculties discovered in the course of historical existence. And even 
214  “I call these mental activities basic because they are autonomous.” Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 
Vol. 2, 70.
215  Here Arendt is quoting Duns Scotus. Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Vol. 2, 12. Whereas in the 
case of thinking she usually refers either to Kant or Heidegger. 
216  “Each of them being most beautiful and best abides always purely (haplos) in his own form.” 
Plato, Respublica 381c. In Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 5–6. London: William Heinemann, 1969.
217  Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002, 13. 
Translation modified. Friedrich Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse. In Sämtliche Werke, Kritische 
Studienausgabe (KSA) 5. München: DTV, 1999, I, § 11, 25, 2–5. 
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she agreed with Nietzsche what came to the odd “ghostliness” (Geisterhaftigkeit)218 
of German idealism. For her this ghostliness was not, however, caused by the 
faculties but, on the contrary, by the “ingenuous exclusion of man and man’s 
faculties in favor of personalized concepts.”219 These concepts were no longer 
metaphors of thought or faculties, but “personified forces” acting behind the backs 
of real men. Furthermore, although Arendt admitted that the faculties might be 
metaphysical fallacies, she did not want to simply destroy them. Instead, she read 
them as riddles containing the only clues we have for the specific experiences 
of thought itself, which should not be reduced to the optics of life itself. In fact, 
Arendt did not want to invent or discover faculties, but to dismantle the covers 
of metaphysical fallacies in order to save the experience of real potentialities 
contained in them. “Not to destroy the ‘rich and strange’ which can probably be 
saved only as fragments”220 was Arendt’s “angelic” message to the demonic forces 
of history even if this message was announced by an angel without wings.
Ariel (Exercise X)
According to the famous parable of Phaedrus, a mortal is defined as a living being 
whose soul has lost its natural wings, literally shed its feathers (pterorrueô).221 
Whereas it is the thinking (dianoia) of philosophers that had the right to re-receive 
the wings of the soul to the extent that this thought endeavors to remember the 
divine lighting, i.e. what makes the gods divine.222 To be sure the metaphors of 
“flight of soul” and the “wings of thought” had since been used to describe the 
efforts of thinkers and poets to raise above all earthly things.223 The danger Arendt 
saw in this effort was forgetting our earthbound condition, which in modern times 
expressed itself more in the sciences than in philosophy.224 For science had made it 
possible that a man-made thing could circle around the earth with celestial bodies, 
and for Arendt the launching of Sputnik was an event “second in importance to no 
218  Friedrich Nietzsche, “Nachgelassene Fragmente 1882–1885.” In Sämtliche Werke, Kritische 
Studienausgabe (KSA) 11. München: DTV, 1999, 41(4). Arendt quotes this fragment (§ 419 in The 
Will to Power) in The Life of the Mind, where she uses Nietzsche’s metaphor of “rainbow-bridges of 
concepts” to criticize German idealism. Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Vol. 2, 157.
219  Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Vol. 2, 157.
220  Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Vol. 1, 212.
221  Plato, Phaedrus, 246c. In Platonis Opera – recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit 
Ioannes Burnet. Tomus II. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905. 
222  Platon, Phaedrus, 249c.
223  See Pierre Hadot, “The View from Above.” In Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as Way of Life. Oxfrod: 
Basil Blackwell, 1995.
224  See especially Hannah Arendt, “The Conquest of Space and the Stature of Man.” In Between 
Past and Future. New York: Penguin Books, 1977.
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other.”225 Yet the danger was not only the military danger posed by the cold war 
“Conquest of Space” and it did not lie in these kinds of technological angels as 
such, but instead in the fantasy that according to Arendt accompanied them, i.e. 
the desire to overcome the very earthbound condition of men.
For Arendt, the phenomenologist, the view from above is always problematic, 
whether the case in question is astrophysics or political philosophy. Thus, instead 
of sharing the Platonic dream of wings, she emphasized how Xenophon’s Socrates 
used the metaphor of wind “to explain the thinking activity,”226 also noting how 
Heidegger “speaks of the storm of thought.”227 For Arendt, thinking cannot grow 
wings in order to fly towards the sun, since it exist only as the storm or the calm, 
in the very gap between past and future. Yet, whereas the medieval theological 
mind had followed the Neo-Platonist quest in trying to illustrate the higher spiritual 
spheres of thought with its angels, the modern “historical mind” had been interested 
in those very storms between past and future. And in order to express the relation 
thought had with the historical temporal tempests, it had also used metaphors of 
the winged creatures. The most famous of these modern “wings of thought” is of 
course Hegel’s Owl of Minerva, who “takes flight only when dusk (Dämmerung) 
begins to break.”228 For only when the tumults of the day are shown in their past 
grayness, the owl can catch its prey and recognize with its night vision that in 
the end “reason rules the world,”229 i.e. legitimate the outcome of these storms. 
Against this owlish “justification of the ways of God”230 Nietzsche will affirm his 
own aristocratic sovereign eagle – the “proudest animal under the sun”231 – that 
falls upon our historical existence from the soaring heights as it attacks the clumsy 
philosophical owls from high above. Arendt expressed no sympathy either towards 
legitimating owls or destructive eagles, but was rather taken by Walter Benjamin’s 
“Angel of history.” In his famous reflections on the concept of history, a copy of which 
he trusted in Paris to Arendt’s own hands, this winged figure from a watercolor by 
225  Arendt, The Human Condition, 1. 
226  Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Vol. 1, 174. In fact Xenophon does not use the metaphor of wind to 
describe thought as such but to describe how the invisible divine reigns in us. See Xenophon Mem. 
IV, 3, 14.
227  Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Vol. 1, 174. 
228  “Beginnt erst mit der einbrechenden Dämmerung ihren Flug.” G. W. F. Hegel, Grundlinien der 
Philosophie des Rechts. In Werke. Band 7. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1979, 28. 
229  G. W. F. Hegel, “Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte.” In Werke. Band 12. Frankfurt 
a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1979, 19.
230  Hegel, “Vorlesungen”, 27.
231  Nietzsche, Also sprach Zarathustra, Vorrede, § 10, 27, 16.
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Paul Klee describes metaphorically the new attitude of a historical materialist.232 
Angelus Novus, who “sees one single catastrophe”233 in the chain of historical 
events, is of course the very opposite of Hegel’s Owl. But even though this patient 
seeker of historical happiness has claws and “razor sharp pinions,”234 it is neither 
Angelus Satanas, “which joins the angelic and demonic forces of life,”235 nor the 
sovereign eagle of the self-appointed Anti-Christ.236 For this messenger that wants 
to prepare the space for the one who not only redeems but also subdues the Anti-
Christ is the figure of profane, “airy” redemption, who wants to redeem the never 
actualized possibilities through an image of happiness that exists “in the air we 
have breathed.”237
Yet we should not mistake Arendt for Benjamin since Arendt did not want to be 
the manly materialist, who in control of his powers is “man enough to blast open 
the continuum of history.”238 Instead in her similar search for origin as the historical 
Urphänomen239 she identified with the figure of pearl diver. She used this metaphor 
232  At least for Arendt, whose interpretation of the Angel is very different from that of Gershom 
Scholem. In his very informative article about Benjamin’s angel the latter, however, uses all his wit 
trying to detach the angel from historical materialism in order to re-attach it to Jewish theology. See 
Gershom Scholem, “Walter Benjamin and His Angel.” In Gary Smith (ed.), On Walter Benjamin: 
Critical Essays and Recollections. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988, 51–89.
233  Walter Benjamin, “Über den Begriff der Geschichte.” In Benjamin, Sprache und Geschichte. 
Philosophische Essays. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1992, thesis 9. Translation “On the Concept of History”, in 
Walter Benjamin, Selected Writings, vol. 4, 1938–1940. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003, 392.
234  See Benjamin’s first “autobiographical” reflections on Klee’s painting. Walter Benjamin, “Agesilaus 
Santander.” (First and Second Version.) In M. W. Jennings et al. (eds.), Walter Benjamin: Selected 
Writings, vol. 2. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005, 715.
235  Gershom Scholem, “Walter Benjamin and His Angel”, 69. Scholem interpreted Agesilaus 
Santander as an anagram of the angel of Satan, Angelus Satanas, which would have joined 
together the angelic and demonic forces of life. However, Scholem claims that the later historical 
angel that appears in “On the Concept of History” had already lost the satanic elements and is a 
purely melancholic figure. Giorgio Agamben had instead questioned the very existence of these 
satanic elements or at least their connection to the Angel’s destructiveness. For this destructiveness 
is not the opposite of, but belongs essentially to the Angel’s non-melancholic redemptive role. The 
destructiveness belongs to historical fulfilment and redemption. “The historical redemption appears 
as inseparable from the capacity to tear the past from its context, destroying it, in order to return it, 
transfigured, to its origin.” See Giorgio Agamben, “Walter Benjamin and the Demonic: Happiness 
and Historical Redemption.” In Agamben, Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1999.
236  “The Messiah comes not only as the redeemer; he comes as the subduer of Antichrist.” (“Der 
Messias kommt ja nicht nur als der Erlöser; er kommt als der Überwinder des Antichrist.”) Benjamin, 
“Über den Begriff der Geschichte”, thesis 6. Translation mine. 
237 Benjamin, “Über den Begriff der Geschichte”, thesis 2. Translation in “On the Concept of 
History”, 389.
238  Benjamin, “Über den Begriff der Geschichte”, thesis 16. Translation in “On the Concept of 
History”, 396.
239  About the origin as the historical Urphänomen, see again Agamben, “Walter Benjamin and the 
Demonic: Happiness and Historical Redemption.”
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first to describe Benjamin’s method of thought (thus replacing the Angelus Novus) 
and later chose it as the metaphor for her own method of thought. 240
What guides this thinking is the conviction that although the living is subject to the ruin 
of the time, the process of decay is at the same time a process of crystallization, that in 
the depth of the sea, into which sinks and is dissolved what once was alive, some things 
”suffer a sea-change” and survive in new crystallized forms and shapes that remain 
immune to the elements, as thought they waited only for the pearl diver who one day will 
come down to them and bring them up into the world of the living – as “thought fragments” 
as something “rich and strange” and perhaps even as everlasting Urphänomene.241 
For a pearl diver is not a winged creature that would fly away, against or along 
the storms of history but more like a mermaid that dives into the sea of history in 
order to save the crystallized souls of the drowned by bringing them back to the 
open air, as she allied this method of diving with the “airy” dance of Ariel. For it was 
from the dancing song which Ariel and the aerial deities perform in Shakespeare’s 
Tempest that she borrowed the metaphor of these diving “objects” as sea-changed, 
rich, and strange pearls. 
Full fathom five thy father lies; Of his bones are coral made; Those are pearls that were 
his eyes: Nothing of him that doth fade; But doth suffer a sea-change; Into something 
rich and strange.242 
This dancing song of the illusionary “spirit of the air” that set the rhythms of 
Arendt’s own redemptive thought differs as much from Dionysian dithyrambs as 
from Augustinian Hymns. And if Scholem claimed that Benjamin’s genius was 
concentrated in his angel,243 we could state that it is this aerial method of historical-
spiritual exercises and the productive diving of the thought-pearls (and not her dark 
female uniqueness) that constituted Arendt’s genius as Thinker. 
Afterthought
But is there after all some feminine plurality which we should recognize in this 
ingeniousness? And should we actually use the word iuno instead of genius? For in 
the Roman experience iuno was the feminine counterpart of genius, and when men 
on their birthdays sacrificed to the genius natalis, women offered wines and cakes 
to iuno natalis. However, these plural birthday deities were named as indefinite 
240  “It is with such fragments from the past after their sea-change, that I have dealt here.” Arendt, 
The Life of the Mind, Vol. 1, 212.
241  Arendt, Hannah, “Walter Benjamin”, 206. 
242  William Shakespeare, Tempest. In Clark & Glover (eds.), The Works of William Shakespeare, 
vol. 1. London: Macmillan, 1863, act 1, scene 2.
243  Scholem, “Walter Benjamin and His Angel”, 86.
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plural junones, and they should not be mistaken for Juno Regina, the spouse of the 
sovereign Zeus. In fact in the ancient world the plural origin (genos) was rather the 
condition of both the private and the divine sphere, whereas the political sphere, 
far from wanting to bring this plurality to light instead demanded the homogeneity 
of origins, thus denying the impersonal heterogeneity expressing itself outside the 
political sphere. And if there was in Arendt’s own thought a fallacy which covered 
up the rich and strange plurality of her productive mind, it was her conviction that 
it is only artificial mediation that guarantees plurality. So in spite of her Ariel spirit, 
in the end she could not affirm the productivity of the plural birthday deities but 
chose to look for the meaningfulness of life in the very hallmark of Juno Regina, 
in Judgment. By virtue of this turn the poetic thought of the plural muses was 
again clothed in the judge’s cloak and the role of the muses was not only to sing 
the songs of men to the Gods, but to bear the messages of their father Zeus, the 
allegory of Judgment. “Homeric historian [poet/muse] is the judge […] the historian 
is the inquiring man who by relating it sits in judgment over it.”244 The plurality of the 
birthday spirits is overshadowed in favor of Regina, who passes her judgment over 
the affairs of men, while the glad tidings of plural births are substituted by the never 
ending reflective judgment that must take place each single day.
244  Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Vol. 1, 216.
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